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FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS

There is scarcely any doctrine of the law which, so far as respects formal and exact statement, is in a more unreduced and
uncertain condition than that which relates to the question
what force and effect should be given by the courts of one
nation to the judgments rendered by the courts of another
nation. Very numerous decisions have been had ... relating to
this question in the various forms in which it has arisen; but if
we should undertake to learn from the opinions of the courts
in these cases' what principles had been decided, we should
find ourselves in utter confusion.'
For many years the topic of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments has been the scholar's delight. Students of
conflict of laws, constitutional law, comparative law, international law, and civil procedure have explored its complexities and
these efforts have not significantly
have proposed reforms. Yet,
2
influenced American law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When international trade and investment increase, so does the
need for satisfactory means of dispute resolution. Dispute resolution in national courts requires that litigants consider not only the
likelihood of a favorable judgment but also the ability to collect
on that judgment. In cases where the defendant's assets lie in
another jurisdiction, collection is possible only if the second jurisdiction will recognize and enforce the first jurisdiction's judgment.3

In the international arena, enforcement of United States judg-.
ments overseas is often possible only if the United States court
rendering the judgment would enforce a similar decision of the
foreign enforcing court.4 This reciprocity requirement places em-

1 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123 (1895) (appellant's brief).
2 Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: A New Yorker Reflects on
Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. Comp. L. 367, 367 (1970).
3 Discussions of transnational dispute resolution often focus on planning for disputes through the preselection of favorable forums or alternative methods of dispute
settlement-particularly arbitration. Many disputes are not founded on a prenegotiated
contract, however, and provide little or no opportunity for choosing other than a national judicial system for the dispute resolution process.
4 For a list of prior commentaries on the issues of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, see infra note 47. This Article deals only with judgments for stated
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phasis on the United States law regarding recognition and enforcement. United States courts have been customarily liberal in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. While the law applied in
such actions reflects a common core of considerations, discerning
the source of the applicable law can be a confusing process. Most
United States courts begin the analysis of foreign judgment enforcement cases with reference to the 1895 United States Supreme
Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot.' Results often are clouded, however, by reference to different sources of the ultimate rules to be
applied, and by the problems engendered when an issue arises in
federal court but, because of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 6 requires
the application of state law.
When proof of reciprocity is necessary in an overseas enforcement action, a litigant will want a judgment rendered in a United
States jurisdiction that has a clear rule of its own on recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. Under the current system,
a United States litigant seeking a judgment enforceable overseas is
best served by obtaining the United States judgment in one of the
fifteen states that has adopted both the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act (Enforcement Act) 7 and the Uniform For-

eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Recognition Act),8 without adding a reciprocity requirement to the latter Act. 9

sums, in any currency ("money judgments"). Other types of judgments (e.g., child support, divorce, descent) create special problems that require considerations beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEYJUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AGT
§ 1(2), 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986) [hereinafter Recognition Act] ("'[F]oreign judgment' means
any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other
than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters."). As used in this Article, the term, "foreign judgment" means
a money judgment rendered in a jurisdiction outside the United States.
5 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986) [hereinafter Enforcement Act].
8 Recognition Act, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 261.
9 For foreign nation judgments, the most important uniform act is the Recognition
Act. Despite the passage of over a quarter of a century since the promulgation of the
Recognition Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
this statute has not produced the type of uniformity brought about by other uniform
acts. While twenty-two states have enacted the Recognition Act, five of these have included a reciprocity requiremenL Of the remaining seventeen, fifteen have also enacted the
Enforcement Act. The statutes of the twenty-two states which have adopted the Recognition Act are ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-180 (1983); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1713-1713.8
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-62-101 to 109 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-610 to 618 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-110 to 117 (1982); IDAHO
CODE §§ 10-1401 to 1409 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 paras. 12-618 to 626 (Smith-

Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 626B.1-.8 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
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A truly national approach to the recognition and enforcement
of foreign money-judgments would be consistent with Congress'
authority to regulate foreign commerce' ° and the Executive's
powers to negotiate in the area of foreign affairs.' However, if
neither Congress nor the President is ready to act, it may be possible for the courts to recognize the importance of this issue to our
foreign relations, through federal common law.' 2 No matter
where the change occurs, however, the resulting rule must further
the goals of uniformity among states and within our federal system, and acceptance of United States judgments in foreign courts.
After reviewing the status of the law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States, this Article
discusses prior attempts at providing uniformity and international
acceptability. This Article considers "uniform" state legislation,
multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, federal legislation, federal
common law, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Each has
advantages and disadvantages depending on the factors considered
most important in a given circumstance.
The outlook for positive change is not promising. Uniformity
through state legislation has proved troublesome both in terms of
the relatively small number of adopting states and the tendency to
vary important terms of uniform acts. Treaties have proved difficult or impossible to negotiate. An amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will be of limited value unless subsequently followed in all states. While federal legislation and federal com-

CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to 709 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§,691.1151-.1159 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.35
(West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770-.787 (Vernon Supp. 1990); 1991 N.M. LAwS 180
(effective July 1, 1991); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90-.94 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718
(West

1988);

OR.

REV.

STAT.

§§ 24.200-.255

(1988);

42

PA.

CONS.

STAT.

ANN.

§§ 22001-22009 (Purdon's Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001.008 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.6-.13 (Supp. 1990); and WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.40.010-.915 (Supp. 1988). The Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Texas statutes include a reciprocity requirement. California has adopted its own act to

deal with sister state judgments. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1710-.65 (West 1982). See Appendix of this Article.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11 Id. at art. II, § 2. 'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Statement of John Marshall in
the House of Representatives, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800), re4rinted in 5 U.S.
(Wheat) app. note 1, at 26 (1820). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
12 See infra notes 192-288 and accompanying text.
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mon law may represent the most likely alternatives for development of a coordinated approach to dealing with foreign judgments in United States courts, they fall short of the goal of certainty in terms of recognition of United States judgments by foreign courts.
There has been no significant effort to use federal legislation
to address the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Thus, litigants and federal courts are compelled to consider the
development of federal common law in dealing with foreign money-judgment enforcement actions. At the same time, the standard
judicial practice of deciding a case on the narrowest possible
grounds also makes this course unlikely, since courts in most jurisdictions can find an acceptable rationale for enforcement of a
foreign judgment. Thus, the lack of a clear connection between
enforcement of foreign judgments in United States courts and enforcement of United States judgments overseas is likely to continue to frustrate attempts at uniformity in United States law.
II.

THE STARTING

POINT:

FEDERAL COMMON LAW, HILTON

V. GUYOT, AND CONSIDERATIONS OF COMITY AND RECIPROCITY

Unlike judgments rendered in sister states, foreign country
judgments are not entitled to recognition under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution."3 Neither has
there been guidance in this area from Congress or the executive
branch in the form of legislation 4 or treaty. 15 Consequently, on
the federal level, the issue of enforcement of foreign judgments
has been left to the common law.
Few cases in state or federal courts discuss the issue of enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States without refer-

13 U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1; see also Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425, 426 nn.6 & 7 (1982); 28 U.S.C.

§

1738 (1988).
14 It would appear that Congress has the authority to develop uniformity by national
legislation governing the enforcement of foreign judgments through its powers to "regalate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. At present, the only
federal statute related to the issue is 28 U.S.C. § 1696, dealing with "service in foreign
and international litigation." This provision authorizes service upon a resident of a judicial district "of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal." It also provides that "[s]ervice pursuant to this subsection does
not, of itself, require the recognition or enforcement in the United States of a judgment,
decree, or order rendered by a foreign or international tribunal." Id. at § 1696(a).
15 The treaty approach was attempted, without success, with the United Kingdom in
the late 197 0s. See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
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ence to the 1895 United States Supreme Court decision in Hilton
v. Guyot' Most courts begin the discussion with the elements of
comity and reciprocity enunciated by Justice Gray in Hilton, even
though they consider state law to be controlling on questions of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, under Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins."7 Whether applying common or statutory
law, Justice Gray's oft-quoted definition of comity is generally repeated:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.'
In Hilton, this concept of comity was applied to a French
plaintiff's request to enforce a French judgment against a United
States defendant. The specific requirements for granting recognition and enforcement through the comity analysis were listed by

Justice Gray:
[Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice

16 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
17 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
18 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64. The "recognition" mentioned in this portion of Justice
Gray's opinion in Hilton is not synonymous with "recognition" of judgments themselves.
Here, it means the acknowledgement that some deference is to be given in the international system to the sovereign powers of another nation. This was emphasized when
Judge Aldisert further refined the Hilton definition of comity in Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972) (citations omitted):
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one
of practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy
and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or
obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights
of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when its
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called
upon to give it effect.
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between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh.19
After an extensive analysis of the law in "civilized nations, "20
the Hilton opinion reached the conclusion that in the majority of
countries, "the judgment rendered in a foreign country is allowed
the same effect only as the courts of that country .allow to the
judgments of the country in which the judgment in question is
sought to be executed."2' Finding that "the rule of reciprocity
has worked itself firmly into the structure of international jurisprudence, ''22 the Court concluded that "judgments rendered in
France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws of which our
own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to
full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country,
but are Prima fade evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's
claim. "21

19 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03. The same test of a foreign judgment was expressed in
similar fashion later in the opinion:
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged
by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and
the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is piima fade evidence, at least, of the truth of the
matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the
foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the
principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should
not be given full credit and effect.
Id. at 205-06.
20 Among others, the opinion discussed the laws of England, Russia, France, Holland, Belgium, the United States, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria, Austria, Italy, Monaco, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Egypt, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Peru, Chili, Brazil, Argentina, and Norway. Id. at 206-27.
21 Id. at 227.
22 Id.
23 Id. "[B]y the principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations,
and by the comity of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to
declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive." Id. at 228. On the
same day, the Court decided Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895), giving conclusive
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While the Hilton case was ultimately decided on the issue of
reciprocity, this element of Justice Gray's comity analysis has been
either rejected or ignored by most subsequent courts. 24 For example, in the Third Circuit case of Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., Judge Aldisert dismissed the reciprocity argument in a footnote, determining that "[t]he doctrine has received
no more than desultory acknowledgement." 25 However, judicial
decisions, 26 statutes,2 7 and Restatements' have continued to be
built upon the other requirements extracted from the comity
analysis in Hilton. Determinations about recognition and enforcement have often been predicated on whether there was a "full and
fair trial," whether the rendering court had competence and jurisdiction, whether the proceedings were "regular," whether there
was due notice and a voluntary appearance, whether the system of

effect to an in personam judgment rendered against an American citizen by a Canadian
court sitting in Ontario, stating that "[b]y the law of England, prevailing in Canada, a
judgment rendered by an American court under like circumstances would be allowed full
and conclusive effect." Id. at 242.
24 It has been argued that the reciprocity discussion in Hilton is in large part responsible for existing reciprocity requirements in foreign nations. Nadelmann, Reprisals
Against AmericanJudgments?, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1184 (1952).
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Other
25 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
cases have, similarly, explicitly rejected the reciprocity doctrine. See e.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (determining that Arkansas law would not require reciprocity); Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W2d 796, 801 (Minn.
1976) (declining to adopt the reciprocity doctrine of Hilton and holding that reciprocity
is not a prerequisite to enforcement of a foreign judgment in Minnesota); Johnston v.
Compagnie General Transatiantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926) (concluding that
New York courts are not bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States regarding the effect to be given to the judgment of a court of France and enforcement of private rights acquired thereunder). Still others have found ways to distinguish it.See, e.g., Direction der Disconto-Geselischaft v. United States Steel, 300 F. Supp.
741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (limiting application of a reciprocity requirement to judgments
and refusing to apply it to the seizure by a British public trustee of certificates of stock
in a New Jersey corporation owned by a German corporation, leaving open the question
of whether the reciprocity requirement extended beyond protection of United States
citizens against foreign judgments); Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 505 (Del. 1960) (holding
that the reciprocity rule was based upon a desire to protect American nationals and was
limited to cases in which it was invoked by an American citizen), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
964 (1961).
26 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert dnied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Johnston v. Compagnie General
Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
27 See, e.g., RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 4, §§ 3-4, 13 U.L.. at 265-68.
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481-482 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 98 (1986).
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justice was "impartial," and whether there was -"fraud in procuring
the judgment."
III.

RECOGNITION AND

ENFORCEMENT

IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER ERE

Following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co., 0 federal courts have consistently held
that state law governs judgment recognition and enforcement in
diversity cases.3 ' Because diversity commonly exists in an action to
enforce a foreign judgment, many such actions are initiated in
federal district court.3 2 Thus, it is often necessary for federal

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law
of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.

29

Id. at 78. But see Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (decided the same day
as Erie).
[Whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the
two States is a question of "federal common law" upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.
Id. at 110.
30 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (Under Erie, the rules of conflict of laws applied by federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction are those of the state in which the court sits.).
31 See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1003-04
(5th Cir. 1990); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Somportex, Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), c&rt. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark.
1973).
32 Diversity jurisdiction is founded on the article III jurisdiction of the federal
courts, U.S. CoNsT. art. III, and is statutorily prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988),
which reads in part:
a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between1. citizens of different States;
2. citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
3. citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
4. a foreign state, defined in § 1603(a) of this Title [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act], as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
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judges to determine the applicable state law rule on recognition
and enforcement. This leads to ' a variety of problems. Not the
least of the problems is that, similar to the federal level, state
legislatures often have provided neither substantive nor procedural
guidance in dealing with the issues of recognition and enforcement. Further, because diversity jurisdiction often exists to bring
enforcement cases in the federal courts, those courts frequently
have little, if any, state common law available. The result is that
federal judges are compelled to determine what the relevant state
courts would decide if faced with the same issue.
In determining the applicable state law rule, a federal district
court is faced with four possible sources of that rule, and three
possible categories of resulting rules. The possible sources of the
rule are:
(1) Enactment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act or a similar statute;
(2) Prior state court decisions setting forth local common
law rules;
(3) Prior federal court decisions determining as best as
possible the law the state court would have applied if it had
been faced with the same issue; and
(4) Sources outside the state where no state statute, state
court decision, or federal court decision on point exists.ss
The rules derived from these sources generally fall into three
categories:
(1) Reciprocity as the principal standard: Some courts
and commentators have continued to adhere to the pre-EDie
federal common law standard of reciprocity as set out in Hilton

Most federal cases involving enforcement of foreign judgments arise under diversity
jurisdiction. Exceptions include those cases arising under federal law, for which "federal
question jurisdiction" exists. Federal question jurisdiction is an article Ill power of the
courts, U.S. CONST. art. III, and is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988): "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." Areas of federal question jurisdiction include admiralty law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988), bankruptcy lpw, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988), and copyright and patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). See, e.g., International Sea Food Ltd. v.
M/V Campeche, 566 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1978) (enforcing a Barbados judgment under admiralty jurisdiction); In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 360 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.
Fla. 1973) (granting collateral estoppel effect to patent issues decided in an earlier Canadian proceeding), rev'd, 498 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1057 (1974).
33 See, e.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (E.D. Ark.
1973).
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v. Guyot.' The reciprocity requirement has been statutorily
adopted in Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas.5
(2) Full faith and credit to foreign judgments: Some
states have treated foreign nation judgments in much the same
manner as sister state judgments, granting full faith and credit
under article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution.m
(3) Comity analysis: The majority have, either by judicial
decision or by statute, embraced a comity analysis whereby a
presumption of recognition and enforceability exists, subject to
certain mandatory and discretionary grounds for nonrecogni38
tion.37 This is the approach taken in the Recognition Act,
9
and in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law."
Even though
lowed the comity
plify the analysis
forcement action.

the majority of jurisdictions appear to have folanalysis of Hilton, this does not necessarily simrequired by a federal court faced with an enBoth the enigma of determining the source of

34 Se, e.g., Corporacion Salvadorena de Calzado, SA. v. Injection Footwear Corp.,
533 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (denying recognition of El Salvadoran "de facto" default judgment because El Salvadoran court would not enforce foreign default judgment);
Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd,
553 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1977) (implying reciprocity in stating: the fact that Costa Rican
court would grant United States judgment full faith and credit required that United
States court recognize Costa Rican judgment); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co.,
232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Cannistraro v. Cannistraro, 352 Mass. 65, 223 N.E.2d
692 (1967).
35 In Georgia, reciprocity is a mandatory ground for nonrecognition. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-12-114(10) (1982). In the other four states, reciprocity may result in the discretionary
refusal of recognition. IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2)(g) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
235, § 23A (West 1986); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.92 (Anderson Supp. 1987); TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (Vernon 1986). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 524:11 (1974) requires reciprocity to be shown for a Canadian federal or provincial
judgment to be enforced.
36 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1; see Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 1009 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Costa Rican judgment entitled to recognition under the doctrine of full faith
and credit as well as the doctrine of comity); see also A. von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and A Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601,
1606-07 (1968).
37 See, .g., Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
38 Explicit in the purposes of the Recognition Act is the hope that "[c]odification
by a state of its rules on the recognition of money judgments rendered in a foreign
court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized
abroad." REcoGNrrON Acr, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 261 (commissioners' prefatory
note).
39 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 481-482 (1987).
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this rule and the vagaries of its application can lead to further
problems.
Because only twenty-two states have adopted the Recognition
Act in some form,40 courts in the majority of states must look to
the common law to determine the applicable rule. Many federal
courts have found it necessary at this stage to refer to cases outside the forum state because of the lack of any clear authority
within the jurisdiction.4 ' The result has been repeated reference
to the Hilton line of federal cases, particularly as the comity analysis has been refined in the Restatements.42 This means that, despite Erie, as a practical matter, the issue is often determined by a
unique distillation of federal common law.
IV. THE PREVAILING CURRENT SOURCES:
THE UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT AND
THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
A.

The Substantive Rules of Analysis

In states which have adopted the Recognition Act, the analysis
begins with the requirements for "recognition" of the foreign judgment.43 If a foreign judgment "is final and conclusive and en-

40 See Appendix of this Article. Decisions in Texas have raised questions about the
constitutionality of the Act itself. See infra note 105. Courts in states without the Act have
looked to the Act as a source in determining state common law dealing with recognition
and enforcement. See, eg., Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 256 N.W.2d 796 (1976); Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241 (N.D. 1980).
41 Se4 e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F.
Supp. 1009, 1012-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
42 RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481-482 (1987); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 98 (1986).
43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 comment b (1986).

Recognition and enforcement distinguished. The judgment of a foreign state may not
be enforced unless it is entitled to recognition. Whether a foreign judgment
should be recognized, may be in issue, however, not only in enforcement ....
but in other contexts, for example where the defendant seeks to rely on a prior
adjudication of a controversy (res judicata), or where either side in a litigation
seeks to rely on prior determination of an issue of fact or law. A proceeding to
enforce a foreign judgment normally takes the form of an action by the judgment creditor to collect a sum due from the judgment debtor under a
Recognition of a foreign judgment
judgment rendered in another state ....
may also be at issue in proceedings before bodies other than courts, for exampie in administrative proceedings.
Judgments granting injunctions, declaring rights or determining status, and
judgments arising from attachments of property, are not generally entitled to
enforcement, but may be entitled to recognition ....
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forceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is
pending or it is subject to appeal,"" then it "is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of
a sum of money, "45 unless certain grounds for nonrecognition
are shown to exist.' This provides the initial preclusive effect of
the judgment so that matters litigated elsewhere are not relitigated
in the United States action.
Both the Recognition Act and the Restatement codify the
comity analysis of Hilton v. Guyot in providing grounds for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment. Although the grounds are generally the same in each, some of them are dealt with differently. The
following chart provides a comparison of the approaches in the
Recognition Act and Restatement:

44 REcoGNITION Acr, supra note 4, § 2, 13 U.LA. at 264.
45 Id. at§ 3.
46 Id. at § 4.
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UNIFORM
FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION AcT

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN
LAW
RELATIONS

(1986)

1) final judgment *

ReFoundational
quirements for Recognition

1) final and conclusive and enforceable
where rendered **

Mandatory Grounds
for Nonrecognition:
Act § 4(a); Restatement § 482(1)

1) lack of due process

cess

2) lack of personal
jurisdiction

2) lack of personal
jurisdiction

1) lack of due pro-

3) lack of subject
matter jurisdiction

Discretionary
Grounds for Nonrecognition: Act § 4(b);
Restatement § 482(2)

1) insufficient notice
to defendant

1) lack of subject
matter jurisdiction

2) fraud

2) insufficient notice
to defendant

8) cause of action
contrary to public
policy

3) fraud

4) judgment conflicts
with another final
judgment

4) cause of action
contrary to public
policy

5) proceedings contrary to agreement of
the parties

5) judgment conflicts
with another final
judgment

6) "seriously inconvenient forum" with
based
jurisdiction
only on personal
service

6) proceedings contrary to agreement of
parties
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* 'That a judgment is subject to appeal or to modification in light
of changed circumstances does not deprive it of its character as a
final judgment." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 481 comment e (1986).
** Generally, the ability to appeal does not affect the concept of
finality of a judgment in United States courts. See Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903). Section six of the Recognition Act
gives the court the discretion to stay proceedings for recognition
and enforcement until the appeal process is completed in the foreign jurisdiction. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at
274.
[The above comments apply to the chart on the previous page]

As the chart on the previous page indicates, there are only
two significant differences between the Recognition Act and the
Restatement. Whereas the Act treats lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a mandatory ground for nonrecognition, it is only a
discretionary ground under the Restatement rule. In addition, the
Act includes a limited forum non conveniens ground in its list of
discretionary grounds for nonrecognition.
A great deal has been written analyzing the various grounds
for nonrecognition and how they have been applied by the
courts.4 7 Some of the bases for nonrecognition have been the

47 See, e.g., Bishop & Burnette, supra note 13; Carl, The Common Market Judgments
Convention-Its Threat and Challenge. to Americans, 8 INT'L LAW. 446 (1974); Casad, Issue
Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53 (1984); Degnan
& Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1988); Ernster, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments: A Clear Position for New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 327 (1968); Golomb, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments: A Goal-OrientedApproach, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604 (1969);
Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in Westera Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367 (1963); Hay & Walker, The Proposed U.S.-U.K Recognition-ofJudgments Convention: Another Perspective 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 753 (1978);
Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A Nero Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (1970); Joiner, The Recognition of Foreign Country Money
Judgments by American Courts, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 193 (Supp. 1986); Kulzer, Recognition of
Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
18 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1969); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of ForeignJudgments: A Historical-CriticalAnalysis, 16 LA. L REV. 465 (1956); Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora
in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995
(1967); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do
About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236 (1957) [hereinafter What to Do]; Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and
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subject of greater judicial discussion than others. The focus of
United States cases is summarized in the following discussion of
those factors most often considered by courts, using the criteria
set forth in both the Recognition Act and the Restatement for
guidance.
1. Finality and Conclusiveness of the Judgment
Although the Hilton opinion did not directly address the issue
of finality, "[a] generally recognized rule of international comity
states that an American court will only recognize a final and valid
judgment. " Final judgments are defined as those that are not

Foreign Judgments, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 221 (1941); Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and
the Second Restatement of Conflid of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 220 (1972) [hereinafter Foreign Country]; Peterson, Res.Judicata and Foreign County Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. LJ. 291
(1963); Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
783 (1950); Scoles, Interstate and InternationalDistinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United
States, 54 CAUIF. L. REv. 1599 (1966); Smit, Enforcement of Judgments in the United States of
America, 34 AM. J. CoMp. L. 225 (Supp. 1986); Smit, InternationalResJudicata and Collateral
Estoppel in the United States, 9 UCLA L REV. 44 (1962); Vlas, The Protocol on Interpretation
of the EEC Convention of Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Over Ten Years in Legal
Practice (1975-1985), 33 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 84 (1986); A. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the
European Economic Community and the United States, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1044 (1981) [hereinafter A. von Mehren]; A. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 36; R. von Mehren &
Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-CountryJudgments in the United States, 6 LAW
& POL INT'L Bus. 37 (1974); R. von Mehren, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in the United
States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977) [hereinafter R. von Mehren]; Woodward, Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, United Kingdom and the
European Economic Community, 8 N.C. 3. INT'L L & COM. REG. 299 (1983); Yntema, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MIcH. L. REV. 1129 (1935);
Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53 NOTRE DAME L
REV. 734 (1978); Note, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments and
Arbitral Awards: A North-South Perspective'lI GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 635 (1981); Note, The
Preclusive Effect of Foreign-CountryJudgments in the United States and Federal Choice of Law: The
Role of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 83 (1988) [hereinafter Preclusive
Effect]; Note, Enforcement ofJudgnents-Interpretationof EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Does Not Cover ProvisionalEx Parte Measures, 17 TEX. INT'L LJ. 252 (1982); Comment, Reciprocal Enforcement of U.S. and Foreign
Judgments, 2 TEX. INT'L LJ. 75 (1966); Note, Recognition of Foreign CountryJudgments-A Case
for Federalization, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 331 (1987) [hereinafter A Case for Federalization];Note,
Recognition of ForeignJudgments-Federal Courts Are to Apply State Laws on Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 8 TEX. INT'L LJ. 247 (1973); Note, Alternative Theories for Establishing a Federal
Common Law of ForeignJudgments in Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Claus=e 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1976) [hereinafter Alternative Theories]; Comment, Judgments Rendered Abroad-State Law or FederalLaw?, 12 VILL L REV. 618
(1967) [hereinafter Judgements Rendered Abroad].
48 Pilkington Bros. P.LC. v. AFG Indus. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 (D.C. Del.
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subject to additional proceedings in the rendering court except
for execution proceedings.49 At least one court has held that
judgments subject to modification in the country where rendered
do not lack finality when the subsequent suit is brought to enforce
only amounts that have already accrued under the judgment. °
Where the foreign court's judgment is enforceable in the foreign
court, though subject to possible appeal, the United States court
may stay recognition until the foreign appeal has run its course."'
Alternatively, the court may permit the opposing party to make
the same arguments for modification that would have been available in the rendering forum.52
2. Due Process
The element of due process has arisen principally in the context of discussions of personal jurisdiction. United States courts
apply United States concepts of due process developed in International Shoe v. Washington5 s and its progeny, rather than looking to
similar concepts applicable in the foreign jurisdiction.5 4 Given the
expansive nature
of this doctrine in determining whether jurisdict
1984) (refusing injunction identical to that which plaintiff had obtained from a British
court, because arbitration was still proceeding, as being an unnecessary interference in
the foreign proceedings); see also Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576 (1943);
Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 RI. 268, 160 A. 205 (1932); Growe v. Growe, 2 Mich. App. 25,
33-34, 138 N.W.2d 537, 540-41 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
§ 481 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (1971). See generally R.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47.
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 comment e (1986). The
concept is defined in the Restatement of Judgments as follows:
[A] judgment at law is not a final judgment if further judicial action by the
court rendering the judgment is required to determine the matter litigated; and
a decree in equity is not a final judgment if further action by the court is required beyond the supervision of the carrying out of the decree.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41 comment a (1942).

50

Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576 (1943).

51

RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 274; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-

EIGN RELATIONS LAw § 481 comment e (1986).
52 R. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47, at 70.
53 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
54 See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex.
1984); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D. Tex.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1981); Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F.
Supp. 292, 296 (D.D.C. 1964); Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio
1951); Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg., 19 F.2d 163,
166-67 (D. Me. 1927); Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431,. 437 (D.C. 1972);
Davidson & Co. v. Allen, 89 Nev. 126, 129, 508 P.2d 6, 7-8 (1973).
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tion exists, most United States courts considering foreign judgments have found foreign procedures in compliance with United
States due process requirements. 55
To comply with United States due process requirements, foreign courts need not have identical procedures.5 6 They need only
be "compatible with the requirements of due process of law."'
Where personal jurisdiction exists, procedures different from those
in the United States enforcing court will not generally rise to the
level of a violation of due process in the granting of the foreign
judgment.5
3. In Personam and In Rem Jurisdiction
Lack of jurisdiction over the defendant or the property involved in the judgment is the most common ground for refusal to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment. 9 Both the Recognition
Act and the Restatement provide that lack of personal jurisdiction
makes nonrecognition mandatory. 6°

55 See, eg., Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. deied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (a contract negotiated with an English company by letter, telex, and telephone considered sufficient to create minimum contacts
with the English forum).
56 Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1987).
57 RECOGNITION Acr § 4(a)(1), supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268; Vrozos v.
Sarantopoulos, 195 Ill. App. 3d 610, 620, 552 N.E.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (1990).
58 "[A] mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for nonrecognition. A case of serious injustice must be involved." RECOGNITION ACT § 4 comment, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268. See Panama Processes v. Cities Service Co., 796
P.2d 276, 285 (Okla. 1990) (differences in procedure not grounds for denial of enforcement of Brazilian judgment where "in Brazil (1) no witnesses of any party may be subpoenaed, (2) testimony of corporate employees is inadmissible, (3) there is no available
process for requiring testimony of indispensable U.S. witnesses, (4) there is no right of
cross-examination, and (5) the parties may neither conduct pre-trial discovery nor subpoena documents"); see also Parsons v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So. 2d 20, 24 (Ala.
1990) (due process is not violated where Israeli default judgment against an American
citizen was not in English, so long as he was served in a method permitted under the
Hague Convention on Service of Process).
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment c (1986); R.
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47, at 48.
60 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a), supra note 4, 13 U.LA. at 268 (1986); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(b) (1986). The Hilton Court required an
"opportunity for a ... trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction ... after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant. .. ."Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 202 (1895). The Court further stated that "[elvery foreign judgment, of whatever
nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings and due notice." I at 166-67.
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Under section 5(a) of the Recognition Act,"' recognition
may not be refused for want of personal jurisdiction if in personan jurisdiction in the foreign action is based upon any one of
the following:
state;

(1)
62

Personal service on the defendant in the foreign

(2) Voluntary appearance by the defendant for purposes
other than protecting property from seizure or for contesting
juris diction of the court;
(3) A pre-litigation contractual choice of forum clause
applicable to the underlying dispute;
(4) Domicile, principal place of business, or place of
incorporation of the defendant in the foreign state;
(5) A claim arising out of business done by the defendant through an office in the foreign state; or
(6) A claim arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state by the defendant.
The prevailing view is that, even if the rendering court had
jurisdiction under the laws of its own state, a court in the United
States asked to recognize a foreign judgment should scrutinize the
basis for asserting jurisdiction in the light of American concepts of
jurisdiction to adjudicate.' International Shoe and its progeny govern the determination here.' 4
Where the defendant appears voluntarily, the Recognition Act
states that recognition cannot be refused for lack of personal jurisdiction.' An exception is provided, however, where the appearance is "for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him."' Even then, where the defendant
has contested personal jurisdiction in the foreign court, and that

61 Recognition Act, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 272.
62 Under section 4(a)(6), if the action in the foreign state was based only on personal service, the court has discretion to deny recognition if "the foreign court was a
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action." Recognition Act, supra note 4,
13 U.L.A. at 268.
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment c (1986); see
e.g., Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Compagnie du Port de
Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 166-67 (D. Me. 1927);
Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 181 NJ. Super. 105, 436 A.2d 942 (1981);
Davidson & Co. v. Allen, 89 Nev. 126, 128, 508 P.2d 6, 7-8 (1973); Jackson v. Stelco
Employees' Credit Union Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
64 See R. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47.
65 REcOGNITION AcT, § 5(a) (2), supra note 4, 13 U.LA. at 272.
66

Id
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court has held that jurisdiction, exists on grounds other than the
defendant's appearance, that decision of the foreign court will be
given respect. 67
The question of in rem- jurisdiction was addressed by the
Hilton Court in dicta." Since United States courts generally consider monetary judgments in personam rather than in rem,6 9 a
court must obtain personal jurisdiction
over the parties before it
70
can grant an award of money.
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Although subject matter jurisdiction is uniformly listed as a
requirement for recognition and enforcement,7 1 it seldom provides the basis for denial of the requested use of the foreign judgment. 72 Those few cases addressing subject matter jurisdiction
tend to discuss it in a pro forma manner, ultimately finding jurisdiction to exist.73 "U] urisdiction of the rendering court over the
subject matter is normally presumed, and an inquiry into possible
lack of competence is initiated only on the basis of a credible
challenge by the judgment debtor or by another person resisting
recognition or enforcement. " 4 Commentators have concluded
that issues of subject matter jurisdiction will generally be determined by application of the jurisdictional rules of the foreign
court.75 Although this is a logical conclusion, there seems to be

no clear authority for it. Regardless, United States courts have

67 Nippon Emo-Trans Co., v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
68 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 168 (1895) ("[A] judgment in foreign attachment
is conclusive, as between the parties, of the right to the property or money attached.").
69 Cherum v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.D.C. 1964).
70 China Mut. Ins. Co. v. Force, 142 N.Y. 90, 36 N.E. 874, 876 (1894).
71 While the Restatement makes lack of subject matter jurisdiction a discretionary
ground for nonrecognition (REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 482(2)(a) (1986)), the Recognition Act makes it a mandatory ground (REcoGNITION
Acr § 4(a)(3), supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268). The New York version of the Act follows
the Restatement position, placing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the discretionary grounds for nonrecognition. N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L. & R. § 5304(b)(1) (McKinney 1978).
72 Even commentators in articles with headings indicating attention to subject matter
jurisdiction tend to focus almost exclusively on personal and in rem jurisdiction. See e.g.,
Bishop & Burnette, supra note 13; A Case for Federalization, supra note 47, at 336-39.
73 See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885, 898 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
74 REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment a (1987).
75 Joiner, supra note 47, at 203; see also R. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47,
at 54-55.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:253

seen fit to reexamine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in
7
the process of recognition. 6
5.

Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

Courts have required proper notice, generally in the form of
proper service of process, as a prerequisite to granting recognition
or enforcement of a foreign judgment. "7 "Proper service" has
been given two possible definitions. According to the first definition, proper service requires compliance with the foreign country's
statutory notice provisions.78 In the second definition, proper service is that which gives adequate riotice of the proceedings. 79 Few
cases have raised a claim of a lack of opportunity to be heard. If
service is proper and the defendant is represented by counsel,
later disputes about that representation appear unlikely to constitute a lack of opportunity to be heard."
6. Fraud
American courts generally list fraud as a defense to the recognition of a foreign-nation judgment." Generally, a foreign judgment can be impeached only for extrinsic fraud, which deprives
the aggrieved party of an adequate opportunity to present his case
to the court.8 2 A judgment cannot be impeached for intrinsic
76 Hunt, 492 F. Supp. at 898 (citing Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Lummus Cotton Gin Sales Co., 6 S.W.2d 728 (Texas 1928)).
77 Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Corporacion Salvadorena de
Calzado v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Bolanos v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 502 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Commonwealth ex reL Thompson v. Yarnell,
313 Pa. 244, 169 A. 370 (1933).
78 See, e.g., Tahan, 662 F.2d at 866 (though Israeli procedure inconsistent with federal rules requirement of second notice. for default judgment, United States unrealistic to
require all foreign judicial systems to adhere to federal rules).
79 See, e.g., Tahan, 662 F.2d 862 (personal service in Israel was sufficient when suit
papers were prepared in Hebrew, even though defendant did not read Hebrew); Boivin
v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (service under foreign service of process
statute, which only required notice by publication, held insufficient to satisfy due process
requirements -necessary to give foreign court personal jurisdiction); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.
App. 3d 1047, 1053, 274 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1971) (personal service insufficient when complaint was served without summons showing appearance date).
80 See, e.g., Laskosky v. Laskosky, 504 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1987) (later withdrawal of
counsel does not constitute lack of opportunity to be heard).
81 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 206 (1895) (dicta); Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 442 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972); Laufer v. Westminster Brokers, Ltd., 532 A.2d 130 (D.C. App. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment e (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment g, § 115 comments a, d (1971).
82 See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878); Laufer, 532 A.2d at
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fraud, which involves matters passed upon by the original court,
such as the veracity of testimony and the authenticity of documents.'u If the foreign court has actually considered and determined the question of fraud, whether "extrinsic" or "intrinsic," the
facts bearing on that issue may not be subject to reexamination
when enforcement is sought in the United States."
7. Public Policy
In applying principles of comity, United States courts have
uniformly declared themselves not required to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment that contravenes state public policy.3 5
Such a declaration, however, seldom has led to the denial of recognition or enforcement. Mere difference in policy or procedure
within the foreign and United States forums will not necessarily
rise to the level of the public policy concern required to deny
recognition or enforcement.8 6 A judgment has been described as

130.
83 See, e.g., Mackay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35, 39 (9th Cir. 1959) (fraud in obtaining a Canadian naturalization decree by false statements not grounds for denial of
recognition); see also Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1929);
The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Laufer, 532 A.2d at 133-34;
Tanimi v. Tamimi, 38 A.D.2d 197, 328 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1972). RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, § 70 comment c (1982) reject the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. In Hilton v. Guyo4 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the Supreme Court noted that certain
allegations of fraud were intrinsic fraud, and that extrinsic fraud was generally required
to impeach domestic judgments. But the Court did not decide whether intrinsic fraud
was sufficient to impeach a foreign judgment. Id.at 207-10. Section 4(b) (2) of the Recognition Act allows discretionary nonrecognition for judgments "obtained by fraud," without specifying whether extrinsic fraud is necessary. Recognition Act, supra note 4, 13
U.LA. at 261.
84 Harrison, 33 F.2d at 667.
85 See, e.g., Somportex v. Philadelphia Chewimg Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3rd
Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Adamsen v. Adasnsen, 151 Conn. 172, 195
A.2d 418 (1963); Yoder v. Yoder, 24 Ohio App. 2d 71, 263 N.E.2d 913 (1970); Gutierrez
v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex. 1979).
86 See, e.g., Hilton, 159 U.S. at 204-05 (procedures of the French courts that admitted
hearsay and testimony not under oath, and that denied the defendants the right to crossexamine witnesses, did not constitute an offense to public policy); Somporte, 453 F.2d at
443 (English judgment enforced even though substantial portion was for compensatory
damages for loss of goodwill and for attorney fees, items for which Pennsylvania law did
not allow recovery); Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp.
907, 909 (N.D. Tex. 1941), af'd, 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942) (the awarding of costs
and attorney fees against unsuccessful plaintiff in Mexican action enforced notwithstanding fact that they would not be granted by the enforcing forum in similar circumstances); Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div. 1958) (Quebec judgment for seduction and criminal conversation enforced even though similar actions had
been abolished in New York); see also Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp.
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necessarily offensive to public policy when it "tends clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in
the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that
sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty,
or of private property .... .

A party generally will be estopped

from attacking a judgment on public policy grounds if that party
initiated the foreign proceedings, unless the enforcing forum perceives an interest in the action other than that of protecting the
litigant.

8

8. Inconsistent Judgments
Inconsistent judgments may arise either in the context of two
conflicting foreign judgments or of a foreign judgment in conflict
with a judgment from another United States court. Although United States courts have at times recognized the later of two inconsistent foreign judgments, they may also recognize the earlier one.89
When a foreign judgment is otherwise entitled to recognition but
conflicts with an earlier sister state judgment, there is no requirement of automatic preference for the sister state judgment.' ,

885, 900 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1014-15
(E.D. Ark. 1973); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712-13, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86, 90-91 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966); Panama Processes v. Cities
Service Co., 796 P.2d 276, 283 n.24 (Okla. 1990); Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 322.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Recognition Act allows nonrecognition if "the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy
of this state." Recognition Act, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 261. This focus on the underlying cause of action has been seen as providing a scope somewhat narrower "than the
test of public policy generally." L von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47, at 61 n.129.
87 Somportex 453 F.2d at 443 (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 26 A. 665,
666 (1893)); see also Ricart v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. Civ. A. 89-0768 (D.D.C.
Dec. 21, 1990) (Westlaw, Allfeds library) (damages awarded by Dominican court enforced
even though liability to deported passenger was for action taken in obedience to immigration authorities); Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 321-22 (The laws of a foreign nation do not
violate the public policy of Texas unless they are "inimical to good morals, natural justice, or the general interests of the citizens of this state.").
88 This rule has most often been applied in divorce recognition cases. See, e.g.,
Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969); Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118,
301 P.2d 1029 (1956); Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950); Warrender
v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), affld, 42 N.J. 287, 200
A.2d 123 (1964).
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment g (1986).
90 Id.;see Ackerman v. Ackerman, 517 F. Supp. 614, 623-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (indicating that a later foreign judgment would be enforced notwithstanding a conflict with an
earlier sister state judgment entitled to full faith and credit), af'd, 676 F.2d 898 (2d Cir.
1982).
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9. Judgments Contrary to Party Agreement
The United States Supreme Court clearly supports enforcement of forum-selection clauses in international contracts. 91 Consistent with this position, United States courts presumably will
show similar respect for choice of forum clauses where a judgment
may be obtained in a different
forum over the objection of one of
92
the contracting parties.
10. Inconvenient Forum
The inclusion of the forum non conveniens factor in section
4 of the Recognition Act authorizes refusal of recognition or enforcement where the judgment is "rendered in a foreign country
on the basis only of personal service," and the United States enforcing court "believes the original action should have been dismissed by the court in the foreign country on grounds of forum
non conveniens. " s This does not require that the foreign jurisdiction recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens as it is
applied in United States courts. It rather allows the enforcing
court to determine whether, if the foreign court did recognize the
doctrine, the foreign court should have dismissed on grounds of
serious inconvenience.94 No similar discretionary ground for nonrecognition is found in the Restatement.95
The forum non conveniens exception is both discretionary
and limited. It is available only when personal jurisdiction is based
solely on personal service. So long as jurisdiction exists on any
other ground, recognition may not be refused because the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum.9 6

91

Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

92
93

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 comment h (1986).
RECOGNITION AcT § 4 comment, supra note 4, 13 U.LA. at 268-69.

94

See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243,1250-51 (N.D. Cal. 1977),

aFd, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980). For the United States Supreme Court's statements of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Piper' Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235

(1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
95 See supra text after note 46.
96 See Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Recognition Act
§ 4(b)(2) inapplicable where jurisdiction based on defendant's prior consent, voluntary
appearance, and numerous contacts with the forum); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Woodstock, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 86, 339 N.E.2d 423 (1975) (same where jurisdiction
based on transaction of business in the foreign state in addition to personal service);
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip., 51 Wash. App. 749, 754 P.2d 1290, 1295
(1988) (same where Canadian court's jurisdiction based upon contacts sufficient under its
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The ProceduralRules of Enforcement

Once recognition is obtained, the Recognition Act provides
that "It]he foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner
as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit." 7 Thus, proof of grounds for recognition provides proof
of grounds for enforcement. However, the manner of enforcement
is not provided in the Act. In some states, the related Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act9 (Enforcement Act) provides the procedure for obtaining actual enforcement.'
The 1964 version of the Enforcement Act has been enacted in
forty-one states, with the 1948 version in three states."° It applies only to a 'judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit" in the enforcing state. 1 ' The Recognition Act, on the
other hand, applies only to judgments of "any governmental unit
other than the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone,
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands." 02 Unfortunately, courts applying the acts have not always
acknowledged this distinction.'
Even though the Enforcement Act, by its terms, initially applies only to sister-state judgments, section 3 of the Recognition
Act provides that a foreign nation judgment entitled to recognition is entitled to enforcement "in the same manner as the judg10 4
ment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit."
As such, the Recognition Act effectively incorporates the Enforcement Act into its terms in those states that have adopted

long-arm rule and voluntary appearance).

97 Recognition Act, supra note 4, § 3.
98 Enforcement Act, supra note 7; see Appendix to this Article.
99 On the issue of enforcement of judgments generally in United States courts, see
Smit, supra note 47.
100 Enforcement Act, supra note 7, 13 U.LA. at 181 (1986 & supp. 1990); see also
Appendix of this Article.
101 Enforcement Act, supra note 7, § 1, 13 U.L.A. at 149.
102 Recognition Act, supra note 4, § 1, 13 U.L.A. at 263.
103 See, &g., Stevens v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d. 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1972)
(applying Recognition Act to an Oklahoma action on appeal in allowing stay pending
appeal); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson, No. 85151 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (applying
Recognition Act to Connecticut enforcement of New York judgment); Ross v. Brewer, 805
P.2d 133 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Recognition Act to recognition and enforcement of Arkansas judgment in Oklahoma).
104 Enforcement Act, supra note 7, at § 3.
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both. Thus, the clearest procedure is provided in states that have
enacted both the Recognition Act and the Enforcement Act. 05
There would appear at first glance to be a problem with federal court application of the Recognition Act in a state that also
has the Enforcement Act. In diversity cases, courts have interpreted Erie to require the application of state substantive law, with
procedural matters governed by federal law. °6 However, Rule 69
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a judgment
shall be enforced by writ of execution, unless the court directs

105 A series of Texas cases have raised questions about the constitutionality of judgment enforcement under the Recognition Act. In Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984), it was determined that enforcement must be predicated upon recognition and recognition could be prevented if the judgment debtor successfully raised
one of the Recognition Act's grounds for nonrecognition. Thus, in order to comply with
due process requirements, a plenary hearing on recognition was found to be necessary,
and due process denied, because "a judgment of a foreign country cannot be registered
under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act by the mere filing of the
foreign country judgment." Id. at 345. In three later cases, the Texas Courts of Appeals
in Houston, Amarillo, and Corpus Christi followed the Hennessy court in holding the Recognition Act to be unconstitutional for failure to provide a hearing on the defenses to
recognition prior to enforcement through the provisions of the Enforcement Act.
Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 776 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989),
reuld on other grounds, 794 S.W.2d 760 (1990); Plastics Eng'g Inc. v. Diamond Plastics
Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987). The Texas Supreme Court ultimately considered the third of these cases
on appeal, determining that a plenary hearing on recognition was constitutionally required. Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1990). Noting that the Texas legislature had, subsequent to the litigation in question, amended the
Recognition Act to require a hearing on the recognition issue (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 36.004-.044 (Vernon Supp. 1991)), the state supreme court said that the
Recognition Act "states that a foreign country judgment 'is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit,'" and a judgment of a sister state is enforceable either by the Enforcement Act's "short-cut" method
that requires only filing of the judgment, or by "the bringing of a common-law action to
enforce a judgment." Dodstocker, 794 S.W.2d at 761. The option to enforce a judgment
through common-law proceedings is specifically retained under section 6 of the Enforcement Act. Enforcement Act, sura note 7, at § 6; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.008 (Vernon 1986). Determining that the judgment creditor had filed a common-law
suit to recognize and enforce its Canadian judgment, the court concluded that the judgment debtor had been afforded notice and a plenary hearing at which all defenses, including grounds for nonrecognition, could have been asserted. Docksteader, 794 S.W.2d at
761.
106 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) ("no one doubts federal power
over procedure"); see also C. WRIGHT, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 59
(1983). Although a general substance/procedure dichotomy has been specifically rejected
as the sole determining factor in applying the Esie test, the United States Supreme Court
has held that an issue presented in a diversity case which is addressed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will be governed by the Federal Rules. Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
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otherwise. 1°7 Rule 69 then goes on to state that "the procedure
shall be in accordance with the practice and
on execution ...
procedure of the state in which the district court is held," except
to the extent federal law prescribes otherwise.10 8 In states without the Recognition Act, the enforcement procedure is not always
clear, and federal courts (and foreign courts applying a reciprocity
test) must either determine for themselves the applicable state
procedure to be applied under Rule 69, or "direct otherwise. " "
This represents one more aspect of the tension created by interpreting Erie to require reference to state law on a matter primarily
dealing with foreign commerce and on which the de facto development of the law is in many ways indistinguishable from other
areas of federal common law.110
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law follows the
Uniform Act analysis in distinguishing recognition from enforcement in section 481:
§ 481. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Law of the United States.
(1) Except as provided in § 482, a final judgment of a
court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum
of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or
determining interests in property, is conclusive between the
parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United
States.
(2) A judgment entitled to recognition under Subsection
(1) may be enforced by any party or its successors or assigns
against any other party, its successors or assigns, in accordance
with the procedure for enforcement of judgments applicable
where enforcement is sought.1 '
The Restatement rule, like that found in the Recognition Act, fails
to aid in resolving the substance/procedure problems of Erie in
federal courts.

FED. R. Civ. P. 69.
Id.
109 Without the Recognition Act, even those states which have otherwise adopted the
Enforcement Act cannot look immediately to the provisions of the latter act for enforcement procedure. The Enforcement Act, without the Recognition Act or some other
directive, applies only to sister state judgments, and not to foreign nation judgments. See
supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 41-42 and infra notes 192-288 and accompanying text.
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 481 (1986).
107
108
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V. TAKING THE UNITED STATES JUDGMENT ABROAD:
DEALING WITH FOREIGN RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENTS

Even though the Recognition Act and the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law take very similar approaches to
recognition and enforcement, states without the Recognition Act
will continue to face problems in obtaining recognition of judgments abroad." 2 When enforcement of a United States judgment
is sought in a foreign jurisdiction requiring reciprocity, the foreign
court must look at the applicable United States law to determine
whether, had the judgment been rendered in the foreign jurisdiction under the same circumstances, the United States court would
enforce that judgment. 13 This creates several distinct problems:
(1) The first problem arises when one court attempts to
determine under another jurisdiction's law what the nonforum
court would have done with a similar set of facts. The confusion and complexity faced by United States federal courts applying state law under Erie are indicative of the problems creat-

112 The Recognition Act was specifically designed to aid in the enforcement of United States judgments abroad as well as foreign judgments in the United States:
Codification by a state of its rules on the recognition of money judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in
the state will be recognized abroad.
Recognition Act, supra note 4, 13 U.L.A. at 261 (commissioners' prefatory note).
113 The Federal Republic of Germany is a good example of a foreign jurisdiction
requiring reciprocity in the enforcement of a United States judgment. Section 328 of the
West German Code of Civil Procedure provides five grounds for refusal of recognition of
foreign judgments. The fifth -of these grounds is a reciprocity requirement.
ZivilprozBordnung [ZPOJ § 328(1)(5) (W. Ger.). In the Federal Republic of Germany,
the reciprocity requirement is "the largest single obstacle to the recognition of foreign
judgments ....
" V. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 351
(1972). The determination about whether reciprocity exists is left to the courts. What to
Do, supra note 47, at 250, 253. A California judgment was denied recognition and enforcement in Germany on the grounds of lack of reciprocity under the California statute
which preceded that state's adoption of the Recognition Act. From this case, commentators have inferred that in the absence of a treaty, German courts will generally deny recognition and enforcement to United States money judgments. What to Do, supra, at 255.
More recent cases have assumed reciprocity to exist between Germany and South
Africa, Germany and Syria, and Germany and France. However, the German Supreme
Court has denied reciprocity to a South African judgment rendered in personam on the
basis of assets owned by the defendant in South Africa, after determining that South
Africa would not recognize the establishment by a foreign court of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents, on the basis of assets owned by the nonresidents in the foreign
country.
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ed, even without differences in the legal systems, languages,
and cultures.
(2) If the judgment was rendered by a United States federal district court having diversity jurisdiction, the foreign court
is forced to try to understand the United States federal system
and the manner in which Erie requires a federal court in the
United States to look to state law. The foreign court cannot
simply assume that there is a single United States law applicable to the issue. It must understand the difference between
those decisions of federal courts applying federal law, and
those applying state law.
(3) Once the foreign court determines that the United
States court that rendered the judgment applied the law of a
particular state, the foreign court must determine whether the
state's law on the matter is to be found in statutes or case law.
In some civil law systems, courts may have conceptual problems
if they are required to look primarily to case law for the rule
applicable in the United States jurisdiction.
(4) In cases where the United States state has neither an
applicable statute nor clear judicial precedent, after it has been
explained to the foreign court that state law governs, it will be
necessary to explain further that state law may be found in
prior federal
court decisions or inferred from the law of sister
14
1

states.

These problems demonstrate the importance of obtaining the
United States judgment in a jurisdiction which clearly states the
law and allows enforcement of foreign judgments without undue
restrictions. States which have not adopted both the Recognition
Act and the Enforcement Act generally provide neither certainty
nor clarity.
Neither are states which have adopted a reciprocity requirement likely to be the best jurisdictions in which to obtain a judgment for which foreign enforcement proceedings are required.

114 For example, prior to the Pennsylvania enactment of the Recognition Act in November 1990, the leading precedent on Pennsylvania law was the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 45
(3d Cir. 1971), ceit. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Professor Peterson has noted the further problem arising from the tendency of foreign judges and scholars "to put heavier
reliance on the work of the American Law Institute than do their counterparts in this
country." Foreign Country, supra note 47, at 266. For this reason, Peterson expressed regret
at "the laconic treatment of foreign country judgments" in the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, noting that it "may invite distorted treatment of American judgments submitted for recognition or enforcement abroad, in countries which impose reciprocity requirements." Id.
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Reciprocal reciprocity requirements lead to the problem of "renvoi," in which the forum jurisdiction's rule requires reference to5
the granting jurisdiction's rule for conflict of laws purposes."
Such a reference in determining the applicable rule may provide
adequate analysis when the granting jurisdiction's law provides a
substantive rule. However, when the granting jurisdiction's law
provides a mirror-image procedural rule referring back to the law
of the forum jurisdiction, there is no easy exit from this analytical
circle.
Hence, the best situation for the litigant in a United States
court is in a state whose law is clearly stated and contains no reciprocity requirement. Some may find a certain unfairness in acknowledging the existence of a reciprocity requirement in the
foreign jurisdiction while seeking absence of such a requirement
in the United States jurisdiction." 6 But it is unlikely that cases
would require a denial of recognition or enforcement on grounds
of reciprocity in a United States court, and would not also raise
the possibility for denial of recognition or enforcement as a result
of other factors considered under the Recognition Act and Restatement analyses.
The rules on recognition and enforcement are relatively clear
in those states that have adopted both the Recognition Act and
the Enforcement Act without substantial alteration. That only fifteen states have adopted both acts without a reciprocity requirement shows how these acts have failed to engender uniformity.
These uniform acts have been available for a quarter of a century.
The mere availability of the acts has resulted neither in uniformity
nor in international acceptance of judgments of United States
courts.
VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT PATCHWORK OF RULES

ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

The Supreme Court has not clearly reconsidered the issue of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments since its 1895
decision in Hilton v. Guyot."7 Thus, any approach to uniformity

115
116

See, e-g., R. LErtAR, AMERICAN CoNmlCTS LAW 9-10 (1977).
The irony of this position is that some contend existing reciprocity requirements

in foreign countries applicable to United States judgments have their roots in our own
Supreme Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 HARV. L REV. 1184 (1952).
117 159 U.S. at 113. The opportunity for review arose in Somportex, 453 F.2d 435, but
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first faces uncertainties regarding (1) whether recognition and
enforcement is governed by state or federal law in a federal diversity case, and (2) whether the Hilton reciprocity requirement has
survived the many state and lower federal court decisions which
have not required reciprocity."' Certainly, it is important to
know what law we are dealing with and what rule that law creates
if we are supporting change. On the other hand, it is the existence of uncertainty that compels change. The preemptive quality
of federal law in matters affecting international relations further
requires that federal law receive serious consideration in any efforts at change.
Although commentators have lamented the absence of a uniform rule on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
they have so far been unable to stimulate successful efforts to
generate uniformity. While the Recognition Act has been enacted
in twenty-two states, this process has taken over a quarter of a
century, and variations on the Act have prevented true uniformity
even in the adopting states. Commentators have supported routes
to uniformity including uniform acts," 9 multilateral or bilateral
treaties, 12° and federal common law.' The point of agreement
certiorari was denied. 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). Post-Hilton Supreme Court cases dealing with
foreign judgment concerns include Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927) (judgment for costs arising out of trademark litigation in a British court in Hong Kong held
conclusive and enforceable in a Philippine, United States Territorial Court); Hapai v.
Brown, 239 U.S. 502 (1916) (in rem judgment of the Kingdom of Hawaii, rendered
before annexation, held conclusive); and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185
(1912) (refused review of Maine Supreme Court decision denying preclusive effect to
Quebec judgment on grounds that it raised no issue subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court). In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Supreme Court, in an expropriation case, made reference to the limited nature of the
reciprocity rule of Hilton. The Court stated that the 1895 case "in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to conclusiveness of judgments, and even then only in
limited circumstances." Id. at 411.
118 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Bishop & Burnett, supra note 13; Homburger, supra note 2; Kulzer, supra
note 47; Zicherman & Brand, Improving the Litigation Climate for Pennsylvania Business: The
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 7 PrIT. LEGAL J. 36 (1989); Alternative Theories,
supra note 47.
120 Se, e.g., HAY & WALKER, supra note 47; Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17

VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977); R. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47, at 82 ("[I]t would
seem that the dual objectives of clear, uniform standards and procedures for enforcement
of foreign judgments in the United States and increased hospitality to U.S. judgments
abroad can best be achieved through the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral conventions.").
121 Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. REV.
805, 820 (1964); Homburger, supra note 2; Reese, supra note 47; Scoles, supra note 47,
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is that uniformity is an important goal. The point of divergence is
the method offered to attain uniformity' 2 Rather than restate
all the arguments for uniformity, the remainder of this Article will
focus on the possibilities for achieving uniformity. Consideration
of any single alternative in a vacuum may provide useful analysis.
Comparison with other possibilities goes further to demonstrate
both the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Each approach is considered here in terms of its potential for success as
well as the extent to which it would achieve the following goals:
(1) uniformity among the states of the United States; (2) uniformity between state and federal court systems within the United
States; (3) increased recognition and enforcement of United States
judgments in foreign courts; and (4) rectification of problems
created by treaties to which the United States is not a party, most
notably the European Convention3 on Jurisdiction and Judgments
2
in Civil and Commercial Matters.
Six approaches may be considered for unification of the law
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. They are:
1) Uniform and comprehensive enactment of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act;
2) Negotiation and ratification of a multilateral treaty
governing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
in those countries party to the treaty;
3) Negotiation and ratification of a series of bilateral
treaties providing for reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments entered in the courts of the other party to each
such treaty;
4) Enactment of federal legislation preempting the field
by making the question of recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment a matter of federal law;
5) Development of federal common law preempting the
field by making the question of recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment a matter of federal law; and

at 1605-07; Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, supra note 47, at 406-08; Predusive Effect, supra
note 47; A Case for Federaization, supra note 47; Alternative Thiories, supra note 47; Judgments Rendered Abroad, supra note 47.
122 See e.g., Alternative Theories, supra note 47, at 642.
123 See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
created for U.S., parties as a result of the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention and their treatment in the related enforcement of judgment provisions.
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6) Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A review of these alternatives demonstrates the problems with
each. None of the six provides a perfect solution. Experience has
demonstrated that significant uniform enactment of the Recognition Act is not likely to occur. United States participation in a
multilateral treaty has seemed unlikely. The negotiation of a series
of bilateral treaties has proved difficult and carries with it the
potential for nonuniformity as well as time-consuming separate
negotiations. While the development of federal law by the legislative or judicial branch may provide a singular rule, and thus result
in internal uniformity, it will not always result in foreign country
recognition and enforcement. Resolving the matter through the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not bring uniformity in
state courts unless all states adopted a similar procedural rule.
A.
1.

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act

The Analysis Revisited and Summarized

The above discussion of the current status of United States
law indicates the problems with approaching uniformity through
the enactment in over fifty jurisdictions of a uniform act. Even
though the Recognition Act has been available since 1962, only
twenty-two states have enacted any version of the Act. Even then,
Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas have included lack of reciprocity as discretionary grounds for nonrecognition. 2 4 Georgia
makes all of the Recognition Act grounds for nonrecognition
mandatory, and includes lack of reciprocity as an additional
ground.'25 And New Hampshire, which has not adopted the Act,
has a separate statute that requires reciprocity to be shown for the
26
enforcement of a Canadian federal or provincial judgment.
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IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2)(g) (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West

1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92 (Anderson 1991); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 36.005(b)(7) (Vernon 1986).
125 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10)

126

(1982).

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (1974).
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The Effect of the Uniform Act Approach

2.

The advantages of the uniform act approach are several. First,
unvarying adoption of the Recognition Act in all fifty states would
provide the type of uniformity engendered by the success of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The U.C.C. has become, in many
ways, a "national" code as a result of uniform adoption throughout
the United States. Given the Recognition Act's similarities to exist27
ing common law, particularly as set forth in the Restatement,1
its failure to garner acceptance in even half the states over a period of nearly thirty years is regrettable.
The Recognition Act also provides uniformity between the law
applied in state and federal courts, because federal diversity cases
consistently hold that state law governs this issue. 128 The dearth
of recognition or enforcement cases dealing with true federal
2
questions has meant that the reciprocity rule of Hilton v. Guyot
has not been reconsidered as federal common law, even while the
states have consistently rejected (or at least avoided) a reciprocity
requirement. 3 0
The Recognition Act has the advantage of providing a clear
code-type form of evidence for foreign courts asked to recognize
or enforce a United States judgment. Its enactment in a state,
even if it does not change the existing common law rules, makes
proof of that state's law in a foreign forum a much easier matter.
There are two principal disadvantages of the uniform act
approach. The first is its inability to deal with problems concerning enforcement rules in foreign jurisdictions. It does not alleviate
issues raised in the enforcement of judgments obtained on exorbitant jurisdictional grounds throughout the European Community
or the states party to the Lugano Convention.' 3 ' A judgment obtained in one member state and based on exorbitant jurisdiction
provisions will still be enforceable in all of the other member
states of the European Community and in the Lugano Convention
states. As a practical matter, this may be unimportant, since little
empirical evidence exists that enforcement of judgments based
solely on exorbitant jurisdiction provisions has been a problem for

127
128
129
130
131

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481, 482 (1986).

Supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
See supra notes 24 & 25.
Infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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United States parties. The fact remains, however, that uniform
adoption of the Recognition Act will not obtain the desirable
article 59 bilateral treaty protection allowed by the Brussels Convention.
The greatest disadvantage of the uniform act approach is that
uniformity is so elusive. The majority of states have failed to adopt
the Recognition Act and others have varied its terms when adopted. While commentators have continued to demonstrate its value
to United States litigants, 132 state legislatures have not given priority to enacting a statute that does little, if anything, to change
existing common law. Even more troublesome is the damage to
uniformity engendered when states have modified the Recognition
Act in order either to make reciprocity a discretionary ground for
nonrecognition or to make 3all grounds for nonrecognition, including reciprocity, mandatory.1 3

B. The Multilateral Treaty Approach
1. Issues Affecting a Multilateral Treaty
Although in the past there may have been doubts about the
power of the President to enter into a treaty in the field of private
international law, United States participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law," 4 the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),1 s5 and the United
Nations
Commission
on
International
Trade
Law
(UNCITRAL) 3 6 make this concern nothing more than a historic
footnote in a world in which the distinctions between
public and
37
private international law are increasingly less visible.
132 See, e.g., supra note 119.
133 See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
134 United States participation in the Hague Conference on Private International Law
was authorized by Congress in 1963. H.RJ. Res. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 77 Stat. 775
(1963) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 26 9g (1988)). The Statute of the Hague
Conference is found at 15 U.S.T. 2228, T.I.A.S. No. 5710. For a summary of the work of
the Hague Convention, see Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private Intermational Law, 36 NETIt. INT'L L. REV. 185 (1989) [hereinafter Information Concerning the
Hague Conventions].
135 Statute of UNIDROIT, 15 U.S.T. 2494, T.IA.S. No. 5743.
136 UNCITRAL was established by resolution of the United Nations General Assembly
in 1966. G.A. Resolution 2205 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6594 (1966), reprinted in 1 UNCITRAL
Y.B. 1968-1970 ch. II, § E. See UNCITRAL: THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw (1986).
137 For a discussion of United States participation in the Hague Conference,
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In 1969, American delegates to the Hague Conference voted
in favor of a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,'
and a
Convention on the Recognition 6f Divorces and Legal
Separations.13 9 The first of these conventions came into force on
February 1, 1971, but only Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Portugal
are parties. 140 The other came into force on June 1, 1970, with
only fourteen countries (mostly European countries) having ever
ratified or acceded.' 41 The United States has never ratified either
convention. Neither is it a party to any other multilateral convention on the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments.
The twelve member states of the European Economic Community are parties to the European Convention on Jurisdiction
and Judgments.14 The Convention, known popularly as the
"Brussels Convention," obligates the member states to recognize
and enforce the judgments of other member states unless recognition is contrary to public policy, of a default judgment rendered
without proper notice, of a judgment that is irreconcilable with a
judgment given in the enforcing state, of a judgment that decides

UNIDROlT, and UNCITRAL generally, see Pfund & Taft, Congress' Role in the International
Unification of Private Law, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671 (1986). Peter Pfund, of the
Office of the Legal Advisor at the Department of State, Office of Private International
Law, has provided periodic reports of the work of that office. See, eg., Pfund, International
Unification of Private Law: A Report on United States Participation-1987-88, 22 INT'L LAW.
1157 (1988); Pfund, Annual Report, International Unfi cation of Private Law: A Report on
United States Participation, 20 INT'L LAW. 623 (1986). For historical information, see
Cheatham & Maier, Private InternationalLaw and its Sources, 22 VAND. L REV. 27 (1968);
Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw, 30 LAW
& CoNTEMp. PROBs. 291 (1965); Nadelmann, Ignored State Interest. The Federal Government
and InternationalEfforts to UniV Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954).
138 Opened for sgnature March 17, 1969, reprinted in 15 AM. J. COMP. L 362 (1967).
139 Opened for signature Fall 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 31 (1969).
140 Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private InternationalLaw, supra note
134, at 203-04.
141 Id. at 202-03.
142 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 21 O.J. EUR- CoMMUNrTIEs (No. C 97/1) 36 (1983) (unofficial
consolidated text) [hereinafter Brussels Convention], reprinted in 18 I.LM. 21 (1979). The
official text is found at 2 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (1969 Supp. Bull. 2) as amended by
the Convention of Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 21 O.J. EUR. COMMUNMES (No. L 304)
(1978), reprinted in 3 Common Market Reporter (CCH)
6003. For a concise introduction to the Convention, see Low, European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments In Civil and Commercial Matters, in 2 BASIC DOCUMENTs OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 855 (S. Zamora & R. Brand eds. 1990), which is followed by the
text of the Convention.
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certain issues of capacity, property rights, or wills law contrary to
the rules of the enforcing state, or of a judgment that is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment, on the same cause of action,
which is also entitled to recognition. 4 Within the European
Community, it has created a type of federal system of recognition
of jurisdiction and judgments which has been compared to the
recognition of sister-state judgments in the United States.' This
system of cooperation has been expanded beyond the Community
through the similar Lugano Convention among the Community
member states and the member states of the European Free Trade
145
Association.

Both the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention
provide that domiciliaries of a contracting state cannot be sued in
the courts of other contracting states where the only source of
146
jurisdiction is one of certain "exorbitant" bases of jurisdiction.
However, a defendant not domiciled in a contracting state remains
subject to such grounds of jurisdiction. 47 While a judgment
against a domiciliary of a contracting state that is based only on
exorbitant jurisdiction is unenforceable in another contracting
state, x4 no such protection is provided for a nondomiciliary.
Thus, a judgment rendered against a defendant not domiciled in
a contracting state is enforceable in all other contracting states,
even if rendered under jurisdictional grounds that all other contracting states consider improper. This problem is exacerbated in
article 4 of both conventions, which makes national exorbitant
jurisdiction provisions available to plaintiffs who are nationals of
any contracting state, against a defendant not domiciled in a con14
tracting state. 1
143 Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at arts. 25, 27.
144 See, e.g., A. von Mehren, supra note 47.
145 European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 319) 9 (1988) [hereinafter Lugano Convention], reprinted in, 28 I.L.M. 620
(1989).
146 Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 3; Lugano Convention, supra note
145, at art. 3. Examples of such exorbitant jurisdiction include article 14 of the French
Civil Code, which provides personal jurisdiction over any party so long as the plaintiff is
a Frenchman, and article 23 of the German Civil Code, which provides personal jurisdiction over a party on the basis of the presence of any property within Germany owned by
that party, regardless of the value of that property or the size of the claim.
147 Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 4; Lugano Convention, supra note
145, at art. 4.
148 Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 28; Lugano Convention, supra note
145, at art. 28.
149 Supra note 147. For example, for purposes of art. 14 of the French Civil Code, a
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The problems posed for noncontracting-state parties, by the
Brussels and Lugano conventions, may be avoided. Article 59 of
each convention provides that any contracting state may enter into
a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgments and
include in such a treaty an obligation toward a third country "not
to recognize judgments given in other contracting states against
defendants domiciled or habitually resident in the third state
where, in cases provided for in article 4, the judgment could only
be founded on a ground of jurisdiction specified in the second
paragraph of article 3. "15° Thus, through treaties with the states
that are parties to the Brussels and Lugano conventions, the United States could avoid enforcement problems related to the convention provisions dealing with exorbitant jurisdiction. This possibility was addressed in the unsuccessful negotiation of a bilateral
treaty on recognition and enforcement with the United Kingdom
in the late 1970s."5 ' Unfortunately, the failure of this effort has
been followed by no other attempt at either a bilateral or multilateral treaty that would accomplish such a goal.
The Brussels Convention is designed to provide uniformity in
jurisdiction and judgment practice within the European Community. Article 63 of the Convention requires that any state becoming
a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) accept
the Brussels Convention as a basis for negotiating arrangements
required by the EEC Treaty, to simplify recognition and enforcement of judgments within the Community 5 2 Thus, no provision
appears to allow negotiation to include the United States as a
party to the Brussels Convention. The Lugano Convention, on the
other hand, is "open to accession by .
other States which have
been invited to accede upon a request made by one of the Con-

national of any contracting state, who is domiciled in France, is considered a Frenchman
for purposes of being able to bring an action against a foreign party in French courts,
whether or not any other basis of personal jurisdiction exists.
150 Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 59; Lugano Convention, supra note
145, at art. 59.
151 See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
152 Brussels Convention, supn'a note 142, at art. 63. Article 220 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1 TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 207 (1987 ed.) [hereinafter Rome Treaty], expressly envisions such a treaty
by requiring the Member States of the Community to "enter into negotiations . . . with a
view to securing . . . the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitral awards."
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tracting States to the depositary state." 53 However, such a state
will be invited to accede only if the existing parties to the convention unanimously agree to -its participation."5 4 Given the difficulty
the United States has had in negotiating bilateral recognition and
enforcement with the United Kingdom, 55 the Brussels and
Lugano conventions, it is unlikely that unanimous consent could
ever be achieved in regard to United States accession. After all,
the United Kingdom, a member of both conventions, has a system
most like that in the United States.
The Convention on Private International Law of the Final Act
of the Sixth International Conference of American States
(Bustamante Code) 156 and the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards157 provide for the general recognition by their Latin
American contracting states of civil and commercial judgments
rendered in other contracting states. The second of these conventions is modified by the 1985 Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity
of Foreign Judgments, 5 8 designed to prevent jurisdictional disputes by setting out the grounds of jurisdiction that will be accepted by the enforcing state. The Inter-American system, like the
Brussels and Lugano conventions, thus has recognized the importance of addressing jurisdiction along with recognition and enforcement.'5 9 The United States is not a party to any of the Inter-American conventions.
2.

Effect of a Multilateral Treaty

If a multilateral treaty were possible, it would provide an advantageous method for dealing with recognition and enforcement
issues. As federal law, under article VI of the United States Constitution, it would preempt state law on the issue. Thus, the same
rule would be applicable in all state and federal courts regardless

153
154
155

Lugano Convention, supra note 145, at art. 62(1) (b).
I&
See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 111, repinted in I THE INTER-AMERICAN S'STEM: TREA-

156
TIES, CONVENTIONS & OTHER DOCUMENTs, Part I at 427-28 (F.V. Garcia-Amador ed. 1983).

157

May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224 (OAS Doc. No. OEA/Ser.A/28 (1979)), reprinted in I

THE INTER-AMERICAN SSTEM: TREATIES,

CONVENTIONS & OTHER DOCUMENTS,

Part I at

476-79 (F.V. Garcia-Amador ed. 1983).
158 La Paz, May 24, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 468 (OAS Doc. No. OEA/Ser.A/39 (1985)).
159 See infra note 176.
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of prior state law on the matter. Perhaps no other method would
deal as efficiently with the issue of uniformity. The disadvantage is
that, absent a treaty with all nations in which a United States
judgment may require recognition or enforcement and vice versa,
such a treaty would create a system in which different rules apply
to judgments from treaty and nontreaty nations. So, judgments
from nontreaty nations would remain subject to the problems of
the current system in the United States, and vice versa.
A multilateral treaty with the .contracting states to either the
Brussels or Lugano Convention could also address the exorbitant
jurisdiction problems of those conventions.16° As either a contracting party to a Lugano-type convention, or a party to a convention receiving the benefit of article 59 of the Brussels and Lugano
conventions, the United States could directly address those prob1 61

lems.

Finally, the multilateral convention alternative, at least for
matters involving the other contracting states, would provide perhaps the best answer to the problem of proving up the United
States judgment and complying with any reciprocity requirement
when seeking recognition or enforcement in a foreign court. Both
the Brussels and Lugano conventions provide, simply, that "[a]
judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the
other Contracting States without any special procedure being required. 16' Each provides grounds for nonrecognition similar to
those found in the Recognition Act and Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law,'63 and provides clear requirements about
the type of document required to prove the foreign judgment.'
Such an arrangement would provide the type of procedural efficiency, which is the goal of the Enforcement Act in dealing with
sister-state judgments in the United States.'6 5
Despite all the advantages of a multilateral treaty approach,
there is no indication that such a treaty is likely in the foreseeable
future. At the same time, however, the success of the United Na-

160
161
162
145, at
163
145, at
164
145, at
165

Supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
Supra note 150.
Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 26; Lugano Convention, supra note
art. 26.
Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 27; Lugano Convention, supra note
art. 27.
Brussels Convention, supra note 142, at art. 46; Lugano Convention, supra note
art. 46.
See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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tions Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 66 offers an example of
multilateral recognition of tribunal awards that could form the
basis for negotiation within the UNCITRAL framework.1 67 The
New York Convention now has over eighty contracting parties in
which a foreign arbitral award will be recognized and enforced,
with "the force of a final judicial
judgment" of the country in
16
which enforcement is sought. 8
In the past, the more limited competence of arbitral tribunals
has meant that enforcement of arbitral awards would not raise the
possibility of enforcement of public law concerns of another sovereign. In the United States, for instance, until relatively recently,
cases held that certain matters of important public policy, such as
antitrust claims, 169 securities law claims, 170 and claims under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),1 could be decided only in the courts and could not be
submitted to arbitration. Recent decisions, particularly in the international setting, have found that the need for consistency and
predictability in policies regarding international transactions justifies the submission of even such "public" law concerns to arbitration.1 72
It is often assumed that a judgment enforcement treaty with
the United States is distasteful to other countries, because of the
abhorrence of United States treble damage actions in antitrust

166 June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention] (entered into force for the United States on June 7, 1959).
167 Supra note 136.
168 New York Convention, supra note 166, at art. 4.
169 See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1968); Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1035 (1980); see also Johnson, International Antitrust Litigation and Arbitration Clauses,
3 J. L. & CoM. 91 (1983).
170 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
171 See, e.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291,
299 (1st Cir. 1986).
172 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims are arbitrable even where agreement to arbitrate
appears in a form brokerage contract that is seldom the subject of negotiation);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration
of United States antitrust claims ordered even though arbitration was to be in Japan by
Japanese arbitrators); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 United States 506 (1974) (arbitration ordered in dispute between the parties, including a claim of securities fraud under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5). See generally
Brand, Nonconvention Issues in the Preparationof Transnational Sales Contracts, 8 J.L & COM.
145, 158-64 (1988).
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matters, punitive damage awards in civil trials, large jury awards
(particularly in products liability cases), the intrusive nature of
United States pre-trial discovery techniques, and the extraterritorial
application of United States laws by United States courts (particularly in antitrust and export trade cases). The ability of arbitral
tribunals to address antitrust and other traditional public law issues-and to award damages in accordance with the applicable
statutes-means that tribunal decisions applying United States
public laws and awarding treble damages are in fact enforceable
under the New York Convention if rendered in arbitration. While
article V(2) (b) does allow refusal to recognize and enforce an
arbitral award where "recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy" 'of the enforcing country,
there is no reason such a provision could not be included in a
parallel convention on recognition and enforcement of judg3

ments.

17

Arbitral tribunals typically set rules on discovery between the
parties in both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations. 174 Thus, it is
conceivable that discovery proceedings similar to those applied in
United States courts could occur in an arbitration subject to the
New York Convention.
Further, protests from other countries against the extraterritorial application of United States laws, particularly in the field of
antitrust law, have an increasingly hollow ring, especially when
decisions in the courts and agencies of the principal protestors
parallel those same criticisms. 17 To face concerns about the size
of United States jury awards, a treaty provision could allow for

173 Supra note 166. See the similar provisions of the Recognition Act and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 15(1), Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Ninth Session, 31 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted in 15 1.L.M. 701
(1976) ("Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such
a manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality
and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting its case.").
175 See, &g., Ahlstrom v. Commission, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 5193 (European
Court of Justice holds E.C. competition law applicable to the coordination of prices of
wood pulp exported to the E.C., by Canadian, Finnish and United States producers and
trade associations); Reaching Across Borders, Financial Times, Mar. 21, 1991 at 23 (British
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, under United Kingdom competition law, orders
Gillette, an American company, to end its shareholding in Swedish Match, a Netherlands
company headquartered in Switzerland).
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discretionary refusal of recognition and enforcement based on
public policy.
Three developments tend to show that foreign governments
should no longer be as concerned about the effect of a judgment
recognition treaty with the United States: the ability of arbitral
tribunals (whose decisions are enforceable in over eighty countries
under the New York Convention) to consider and grant awards in
public law matters; the ability of those tribunals to adopt discovery
procedures mirroring those in United States courts; and the increasing tendency of foreign courts and agencies to apply their
own laws extraterritorially. Important differences remain between
litigation and arbitration, particularly the ability of the parties in
arbitration to participate in the selection of the arbitrators. Parties
may avoid arbitrators likely either to award treble damages in
public law matters, or to authorize United States court-style discovery. But the distinctions between arbitration and litigation have
diminished substantially since the signing of the New York Convention in 1958. Thus, it may be appropriate to consider opening
negotiations in UNCITRAL or another body, on a convention
for
176
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

176 The parallels with the Brussels Convention, supra note 142, are worth mentioning
here. Consideration of a judgments convention among the Community member states was
directed in article 220 of the Rome Treaty, supra note 152. That provision, however,
required only that member states "enter into negotiations with each other with a view to
securing for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification of formalities governing
the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of
arbitration awards." The resulting Brussels Convention dealt first with coordination of
rules regarding jurisdiction, indicating that this was a necessary precondition to agreement on the enforcement of the resulting judgments. It may be that multilateral consideration of a judgments recognition and enforcement convention will result in valuable
consideration of the existing jurisdictional approaches of the nations involved. This could
become either a hindrance in seeking agreement, or an important effort in coordinating
judicial procedure generally.
The Brussels Convention also serves as an example that could be followed in other
regional trade agreements. Perhaps consideration should be given, in the negotiation of a
North American Free Trade Agreement, to a provision similar to article 220 of the Rome
Treaty-calling for negotiations among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, with the
goal being to simplify the "formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments." Rome Treaty, supra note 152.
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C. The Bilateral Treaty Approach
1. Issues Affecting a Bilateral Treaty
The only recent United States attempt at a bilateral treaty on
recognition and enforcement of judgments occurred in the late
1970s with the United Kingdom. The treaty was negotiated and
initialed, but never signed. 7 7 This unsuccessful effort was particularly disappointing, since the United States derived its legal system from the United Kingdom. This failure demonstrates the
extreme difficulty in obtaining such a bilateral agreement.
The negotiations between the United States and the United
Kingdom on a Convention Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters arose in part
in response to the European Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments in Civil Matters (Brussels Convention).178 Under article 59
of the Brussels Convention, such a treaty would have removed the
threat against United States domiciliaries in the United Kingdom,
who face judgments from other European Community member
states. United States domiciliaries would have been protected from
judgments founded on exorbitant jurisdiction provisions of local
79
civil codes.'
The Draft Convention between the United States and the
United Kingdom did contain a provision protecting United States
defendants against enforcement of exorbitant jurisdiction foreign
judgments in England.' Negotiations on the convention nevertheless broke down amid English concerns about enforcement of
United States multiple damages awards (particularly in antitrust

177 United Kingdom-United States Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, initialed at London, initialed October 26, 1976,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977) (1976 Draft). The 1976 Draft was revised in 1979. Draft
Convention on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters,
Third Consultative Paper, March 1979 [hereinafter 1979 Draft], re'inted in 8 N.C.J. INT'L

& COM. REG. 322 (1983). See Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-ofJudgments Convention
Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEx. INT'L LJ. 421 (1976); Hay &
Walker, supra note 47; North, The Draft UK/US. Judgments Convention: A British virewpoint,
1 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979); Smit, supra note 120; Woodward, supra note 47 (to
which the 1979 Draft of the Convention is appended, complete with changes proposed
by the two parties); Zaphiriou, supra note 47; Comment, The Effect of the Proposed US.-UK
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments Treaty on Current Recognition Practice
in the United States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119 (1979).
178 Supra note 142.
179 Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
180 1979 Draft, supra note 177, at art. 18.
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cases), United States products liability judgments, "excessive" United States jury verdicts in tort cases, and United States discovery
judgments.'
The United Kingdom withdrew from negotiations
in 1980,182 despite substantial changes from the 1976 Draft addressing these issues.183 No further attempts
at a bilateral treaty
84
have been initiated by the United States.
2. Effect of a Bilateral Treaty
Like a multilateral treaty, a bilateral treaty would have the
effect of unifying-in both state and federal courts-federal law
applicable to judgments of the other nation's courts. A series of
such treaties could also address concerns arising from the Brussels
and Lugano conventions on a nation-by-nation basis. Further, such
treaties could provide specifically for the manner of proving the
foreign judgment for which recognition or enforcement is sought,
and thus avoid current concerns about proving the United States
judgment, and meeting reciprocity requirements of foreign courts.
Given the unfortunate results of the negotiations with the United
Kingdom, however, the possibility for a series of such agreements
(let alone a single treaty with that nation to which our legal system is most closely tied) is remote at best.
D.

Federal Legislation on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments

1. Issues Affecting Federal Legislation
Addressing the problems of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments through federal legislation may be the most
direct path to true unification of United States law on the matter.
Such an approach would be consistent with Congress' power "to
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states."8 5 Like alien registration, considered by the Supreme

181
182
183

See Woodward, supra 47, at 312-13.
See A. von Mehren, supra note 47, at 1060 n.61.
See Woodward, supra note 47, at 312-14.

184 Such a treaty has been negotiated between Australia and the United Kingdom.
Australia-United Kingdom Agreement Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Canberra, August 23,
1990.
185 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. There is little doubt that congressional power over foreign commerce includes the authority to preempt state law dealing with recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. See, e.g., A Case for Federalization, supra note 47, at 347.
While some have questioned whether federal common law in the foreign judgments area
can be based on the general foreign affairs power of the federal government, they have
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Court in Hines v. Davidowitz,116 enforcement of foreign judgments is an area in which Congress might determine that "whether or not [it] is of such a nature that the Constitution permits
only of one uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the
might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirCongress
187
able."
The Constitution explicitly grants to Congress the power to
"prescribe the Manner in which ... Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof," when requiring that
one state give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of
other states."8 8 If Congress is to have such power over the judicial authority of the states in regard to recognition of sister-state
judgments, it is consistent for Congress to have similar power in
regard to foreign country judgments.
Even if enforcement of judgments should be determined to
be an area otherwise reserved to the states, when the process
threatens to impinge on foreign relations, the issue is solely a.
federal matter to which state law will not apply. In Zschernig v.
iMiller,'8 9 the courts of Oregon denied an inheritance to a resident of East Germany because he could not satisfy the court that
his country allowed Americans to inherit estates in East Germany.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court found "an intrusion
by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution

nonetheless asserted that federal courts can use the foreign commerce power as justification for a federal common law rule. Aliernative Tluoies, supra note 47.
186 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
187 Id. at 73. The Hines Court expressly refused to rule on the contention that "the
federal power in [the field of registration of aliens], whether exercised or unexercised, is
exclusive." Id. The nature of issues for which the Court considers federal law displacement of state law appropriate was indicated by the Hines Court as follows:
It cannot be doubted that both the state and the federal [alien] registration
laws belong "to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this
whole nation with other nations and governments." Consequently the regulation
of aliens is . . . intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the
national government . . . . And where the federal government, in the exercise

of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states
cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with,
curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.
Id. at 66-67.
188 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
189 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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entrusts to the President and the Congress."19 This rejection of
the application of state law in an area (probate) traditionally reserved for the states indicates the importance of a uniform federal
approach to matters touching on foreign relations.
2.

Effect of Federal Legislation

Federal legislation would seem appropriate in the recognition
of foreign judgments. Like a pervasive multilateral treaty, a preemptive federal law could serve to unify the United States rules
both among the states and between the state and federal systems.
While it would not guarantee recognition and enforcement of
United States judgments in foreign courts, it would provide greater predictability by putting United States law in a code-type format
more likely cognizable in foreign courts. It would not, however,
solve the problem created by the enforcement of judgments based
on exorbitant jurisdiction under article 3 of the Brussels and
Lugano conventions. Because of these problems, a federal law
obtained through a multilateral treaty, with parties including the
member states of the European Community and EFTA, would be
more desirable.19 1
E. Federal Common Law as the Source of a Singular Rule
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,192 the Supreme Court declared
there to be "no federal general common law," and directed federal courts to apply the law of the state "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress..
,"93 Although there may be no federal "general" common law,
subsequent cases have made it clear that there are areas in which

190
191
192
193

1&t at 432.

See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1d& at 78.
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194
federal courts appropriately may mold special common law.
These rules have been described as "substantive rules of decision
not expressly authorized by either the Constitution or any Act of
Congress," which "supplant state law."'95

1. Room for a Federal Rule Under Current Theory
The Supreme Court has recognized this special form of feder196
al common law in cases involving federal proprietary interests, 197
obligations and rights of the United States under its contracts,
civil liability of federal officials for acts taken in the course of
their duty,198 admiralty cases, 199 contracts governed by the
disputes, 20 1
Act,200 interstate
Labor Management Relations

194

See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1989):

In most fields of activity, to be sure, this Court has refused to find federal preemption of state law in the absence of either a clear'statutory prescription, . . .
or a direct conflict between federal and state law . . . . But we have held that a
few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," . . . are so committed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is
pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called "federal common law."
Id. at 504 (citations omitted).
195 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MiLLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1988).
§ 4514 (1982 & Supp.
196 See, eg., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal common law controlled the issue of liability for a check issued by the United States that had
been stolen and cashed). In a later case, the Court recognized that even though federal
interests are involved, state law may be adopted by a federal court as the federal standard where "application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law." United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979).
197 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-94
(1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); National Metron
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945).
198 See, eg., Westfll v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593,
597 (1959); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-74 (1959) (plurality opinion).
199 This power derives from Article III,§ 2 of the Constitution, which extends the
federal judicial power to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (state workmen's compensation award overturned where application of state law was seen as undermining uniform application of
federal maritime law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Kermarec
v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
200 Se4 e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(Section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act vests the federal courts with power to
establish federal common law of labor agreements.),
201 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938) (in case decided same day as Erie Court"held that federal common law controlled
apportionment of an interstate stream between two states).
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2 °3
interstate pollution," 2 enforcement of constitutional rights,
native American relations, 0 4 and foreign relations.0 ' Cases
have also applied federal common law analysis to issues of mixed
procedure and substance that had previously been found to call
for the application of state law. These cases have dealt with questions of the statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 ac2067
20 7 and distions,"° enforceability
of a forum selection clause,
208
missal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

202 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that federal
common law would provide a remedy against municipal pollution of Lake Michigan even
though no federal statute created such a remedy). But see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972
displaced federal common law, and that federal common law could not be the source of
standards more stringent than those contained in the statute).
203 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a private damage remedy for unreasonable searches
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though neither the Constitution nor any federal statute provides such a remedy); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 378 (1983) ("When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by a clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the
statutory remedy itself, that the Court's [common law] power should not be exercised.");
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (limitations on the Bivens remedy prevented its application to suit for damages from alleged violation of the first amendment, where federal employee was demoted for making critical statements about working conditions
(claimed by his superiors to be false) to the news media).
204 See, e.g., County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226) (Indian
relations are exclusive province of federal law under article I, § 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, and tribe had federal common law action for violation of possessory rights conveyed unlawfully in 1795).
205 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applied
federal common law act of state doctrine to Cuban nationalization of sugar, without
reference to any federal statutory basis for such a doctrine), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062
(1985).
For various approaches to the categorization of areas of federal common law, see 19
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 195; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICtION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 85-107 (1980); Hill, The Law-Making

Power of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967);
see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981):
[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned
with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international
disputes implicating conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
206 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) (application of single statute of limitations in each state "minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations
would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by § 1983").
207 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
208 Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985).
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In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,2."9 the Supreme Court
continued the development of federal common law in regard to
United States rights and obligations under contracts, and civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their
duty.21 The Court found "the reasons for considering these
closely related areas to be of 'uniquely federal' interest [applicable] as well to the civil liabilities arising out of the performance of
federal procurement contracts."21 ' The family of a United States
Marine helicopter co-pilot, who had drowned when his helicopter
crashed in the ocean, brought a products liability action. After
trial and a $725,000 jury award, the defendant manufacturer appealed the district court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that militry conttactors are protected from such actions when the product complies with applicable government procurement specifications.
Justice Scalia provided a two-step analysis in determining
whether a federal common law rule would be applied in Boyle.
The first step was to find that the area involved a uniquely federal
interest. The next step was explained as follows:
That the procurement of equipment by the United States
is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end
the inquiry. That merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law. Displacement
will occur only where, as we have variously described, a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable "federal policy or
interest and the [operation] of state law," . . . or the application of state law would "frustrate specific objectives" of federal
legislation. The conflict with federal policy, need not be as
sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when.
Congress legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied." . .. Or to put the point differently, the fact that

209 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
210 It is interesting to compare the majority opinion by Justice Scalia in Bcye, adopting a rule of federal common law, with his dissent in Stevart, 487 U.S. 22, where he
objected to the majority decision applying federal law to the enforcement of a forumselection clause in a dispute over a distributorship contract. A similar comparison can be
made between Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Stewart, and Justice Brennan's dissent
in Boy!k in which Justice Marshall joined. A comparison of these two cases accents the
need to develop a clearer approach to the application of federal law in cases of mixed
substance and procedure. Despite the tensions indicated by the differing positions of
various Justices, these cases do provide consistency of result, in that both were decided in
favor of the application of federal law.
211 Bcy/ 487 U.S. at 505-06.
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the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes
what would ,otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce preemption into one that can. But conflict there must be. In some
cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area
conflicts and is replaced by federal rules. In others, the conflict
is more narrow,
and only particular elements of state law are
212
superseded.
In Boyle, the Court found the state-imposed duty of care, applied by the jury in determining that the helicopter should have
been equipped with an escape hatch opening outward, to be in
direct conflict with the duty imposed by the federal government
contract specifications. 21 This was the conflict justifying preemption through federal common law.
Like most other cases establishing federal common law rules,
Boyle tied both the existence of the rule, and its ability to preempt
state law rules, to a federal statute. 14 The Rules of Decision
Act, 215 considered by the Erie Court to prevent the existence of a
general federal common law, appears to require such a tie to either the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute:
[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
216
they apply.
Despite this apparent requirement of a tie to one of three
sources of written federal law, not all cases applying federal common law have provided such a nexus. This is particularly so in the
area of federal common law dealing with foreign relations.

212 Id. at 507-08 (citations omitted).
213 Id. at 510.
214 The Federal Tort Claims Act authorization of damages recovery against the United States for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of government employees, is subject to a specific exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988), for a claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The
Court found the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment "assuredly a
discretionary function within the meaning of this provision." Bo/e; 487 U.S. at 511.
215 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). This Act originated in § 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92.
216 Id.
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The principal foreign relations case applying a rule of federal
common law is Banco Nadonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino." In
Sabbatino, Sugar imported by an American commodity broker had
been expropriated by Cuba prior to its importation. In preventing
an action by the former owners of the sugar for payment, the
Court applied the act of state doctrine, determining that the case
fell within the rule that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." 1 ' The
Court was unable to discern a clear nexus for the act of state
doctrine in either the Constitution or a statute.
Despite the classic statement of the act of state doctrine, Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Sabbatino acknowledges that the
doctrine is not dictated by historic notions of sovereignty.2 19 Similarly, international law neither requires nor forbids application of
the act of state doctrine.2 20 Further, "It]he text of the Constittition does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity
of foreign acts of state." 2 However, the doctrine is based on
"constitutional underpinnings":
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns
the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement
in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in
the international sphere ....
If federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in
this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left
free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the
doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had
been no federal pronouncement on the subject.222

217 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
218 Id- at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
219 Id. at 421.
220 Id- at 421-22.
221 Id at 423.
222 Id at 423-24.
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Noting that pre-Erie courts were "not burdened by the problem of
the source of applicable law" in act of state cases, the Sabbatino
court found precedent for development of federal common law in
other "enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the
States. "2
The analogy between the act of state doctrine as a rule of
federal common law, and a federal, common law rule on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, reveals important
similarities. The act of state doctrine prescribes judicial deference
to the legislative and executive "acts of the government of another
done within its own territory."224 A rule on foreign judgments
would simply extend this doctrine to provide deference to the acts
of the judicial branches of foreign governments in appropriate
circumstances.

225

Recent cases lend support to the possibilities for the development of federal common law on issues important to transnational
commercial relations. In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 221 the Supreme Court held that federal law governs the
enforceability of forum selection clauses because the issue is procedural under Erie. This is a natural extension of the Court's 1972
decision in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.227 Prior to the Bremen

decision, United States courts had been reluctant to enforce clauses which would "oust" them of jurisdiction.2 28 In some ways, Bre-

223 I& at 426.
224 Id. at 416; see supra note 218 and accompanying.
225 Fears of undue deference to foreign courts seem adequately addressed by the
grounds for nonrecognition found in both the Recognition Act and the Restatement. See
supra chart at 15.
226 487 U.S. 22 (1988), affg 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987).
227 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For a discussion of the pre-Bremen case law which often found
choice of forum provisions void as against public policy, see Gruson, Forum-&Section Clauses
in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138-47.
228 See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. Monrose, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. disnisse4, 359 U.S. 180 (1959) ("[A]greements in advance of controversy whose
object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not
be enforced."). It has been said that this position rested on the rationale that "(1) the
parties cannot by agreement in the contract alter the jurisdiction of the courts, and
(2) such contractual stipulations are violative of public policy." V. NANDA, THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 8.021] [a] (1986). Some commentators consider
significant the distinction between conferring and ousting jurisdiction (prorogation versus
derogation in civil law terms). However, it has also been suggested that "It]he real issue . . . is not whether the parties can by agreement 'confer' or 'oust' jurisdiction, but
whether the selected or ousted court will exercise its own jurisdiction in such a way that
gives effect to the intention of the parties." G. DALAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACrs
§ 6.01 (1986). Compare Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) ("No one
seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause 'ousted' the District Court
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men represented a compelling argument on policy grounds to
continue this approach. A German firm had contracted to tow an
American company's oil-drilling rig from Louisiana to a point in
the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Italy. When the rig was damaged
in an accident in international waters, it was brought to Tampa,
Florida, where the rig's owner brought an action in Federal District Court against the owner of the tug, claiming both in personam jurisdiction over the owner, and in rem jurisdiction over the
tug.
The Bremen contract had two important clauses for purposes
of the litigation. In one, the owner of the rig waived any right to
hold the towing company liable for damage to the rig while at
sea, even if such damage resulted from the negligence of the
towing company or its employees. 29 Such a clause was arguably
void as against public policy in the United States, 210 but enforceable in England."3
The second pertinent provision of the Bremen contract was a
clause providing that "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before
the London Court of Justice." If this clause-were upheld, requiring
the United States court to decline jurisdiction, then the waiver of
liability clause was also likely to be effective. Cases prior to Bremen
arguably required a holding that both clauses were contrary to the
23 2
public policy of the forum in which suit was brought.
By upholding the choice of forum clause, the Supreme Court
recognized the need to facilitate transnational commerce, and
allow parties to determine the conditions of such transactions,
when it stated that "[t]he expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts." 23 Although the
parties were American and German, and the transaction involved
carriage from the United States, to Italy, the Court upheld the

of jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] action. The threshold question is whether that court
should have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically
enforcing the forum clause.").
229 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 3 n.2.
230 Id.at 8 n.10; see also Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co.,

372 U.S. 697 (1963); Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
231 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8 n.8.
232
233

ee supra note 228.
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
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choice of an English forum, recognizing that the parties to an
international transaction often have good reason to provide for a
neutral forum for the resolution of disputes. m In doing so, the
Court stated that forum selection clauses "are prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by23 the
re5
sisting party to be unreasonable under the circumstances."

234 I& at 13. When the same dispute was litigated concurrently in the English courts,
the English Court of Appeals sustained jurisdiction there under the choice of forum
clause, despite the fact that the transaction had no connection with England, noting that
"in the absence of strong reason to the contrary," the discretion of the English court
"will be exercised in favour of holding parties to their bargain." Unterweser Reederei
GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 158, 163 (C.A. 1968).
235 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. Even though the Bremen holding was specifically limited to
cases of federal district courts sitting in admiralty jurisdiction, id., lower federal courts
and state courts generally have extended its rationale to nonadmiralty cases. See. e.g.,
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilgham Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied; 464 U.S. 938 (1983); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, SA, 663 F.2d
886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 168
(9th Cir. 1975); Staco Energy Prod. Co. v. Driver-Harris Co., 509 F. Supp. 1226, 1227
(S.D. Ohio 1981) (dictum); Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (C.D.
II. 1979); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. v. Fiat, S.P.A., 84 F.R.D. 299, 305
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (dictum); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For state courts, see,
e.g., Abadou v. Trad, 624 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1981); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan,
GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Societe Jean Nicolas et
fils, J.B. v. Mousseux, 123 Ariz. 59, 597 P.2d 541 (1979); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976); Elia Corp.
v. Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Green v. Clinic Masters,
Inc., 272 N.W.2d 813 (S.D. 1978); Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv.
Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
The Bremen court qualified its position on enforcement of forum-selection clauses by
specifically noting that the agreement enforced there was "unaffected by fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. Subsequent courts,
the Restatement, and the now-withdrawn Model Choice of Forum Act, have interpreted
Bremen to provide a presumption of validity for a choice of forum clause, with the party
contesting the provision carrying the burden of proving grounds for an exception. See,
e.g., Santamauro v. Taito do Brasil Industria E Comercia Ltd., 587 F. Supp. 1312, 1314
(E.D. La. 1984) ("The burden is on the party resisting enforcement of the clause to
prove that the choice was unreasonable, unfair or unjust, or to show that the clause is
invalid by reason of fraud or overreaching or that enforcement would contravene a
strong public policy of this forum."); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp.
438, 441 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aftid, 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981), cet. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982) ("Agreements entered into by knowledgeable parties in an arm's-length transaction that contain a forum selection provision are enforceable absent a showing of
fraud, overreaching, unreasonableness or unfairness."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
OF LAws § 80 (1971); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws, MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT (1968), text reprinted in Reese, The Model Choice of
Forum Ac4 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 292 (1969). The Model Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968, and was withdrawn in
1975. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK
142 (1975).

FOREIGN MONEYJUDGMENTS

1991]

t

309

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly applied
federal law to dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Sibaja v. Dow Chemia 2 involved a case brought by Costa Rican
plaintiffs against two United States multinational corporations. In
applying federal law, the court determined the forum non conveniens doctrine to be a rule of venue rather than a rule of decision." v Consequently, the resulting deference to a more convenient forum was not "substantive," and did not determine the
outcome of the litigation, because the application of the forum
non conveniens doctrine "was a decision that occurred before, and
completely apart from, any application of state substantive
law.

"2 8

3

The only court that appears to have addressed the issue directly has rejected the idea of a general rule of federal common
law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments.2 9 However, that rejection had no direct effect on the outcome of the case
and is, at best, dictum.
In the post-Hilton, pre-Efie case of Johnston v. Compagnie
40 Justice Pound held that the New York
CGnrale Transatlantique,"
courts were not bound by the reciprocity rule of Hilton. He reasoned that state courts are not bound by United States Supreme
Court cases dealing with questions "of private rather than public
international law, of private right rather than public relations,"
and concluded that "our courts will recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws and the sufficiency of the evidence
establishing such rights."2 4' Thus, the Johnston case has become a
leading authority for the position that states may enforce foreign
judgments absent proof of reciprocity (or even in the face of
proof of no reciprocity), and for the proposition that federal common law is binding on international law matters only insofar as
those matters fall under the rubric of "public" international
law. 242 Some have noted that the result of the public-private dis-

236 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
237 Id. at 1219.
238 Id.
239 Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1011-12 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
240 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
241 Id. at 387, 152 N.E. at 123.
242 See, e.g., Alternative Theories, supra note 47, at 644 ("[T]he development of federal
case law indicates that federal common law encompasses only public and not private
international law."). Interestingly, no case is cited in the footnote offered in support of
this statement.
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tinction in matters of international law is that "[a]ll matters of
'public' international law are, on their face, controlled by federal
law, while 'private' international law questions may normally be
determined according to state law," 243 and that Zschemig v. Mille?'4 "merely refines this principle to provide for federal control
in instances where a private international transaction has a direct
impact on federal interests of a public international law na245
ture."
While the public-private distinction may have offered Justice
Pound the opportunity to circumvent the reciprocity requirement
prior to Erie, it is not helpful in a world in which the distinction
between "public" and "private" international law is often blurred at
best.246 Further, the participation of our national government in
institutions dedicated specifically to the development of private
international law, and the ratification of conventions prepared by
these institutions belies the argument that it is inappropriate for
the federal government to be involved in such matters, or that
courts should not follow a consistent pattern in the development
of federal common law. It is incongruous to assume that in an
area where federal legislation preempts state legislation, state common law would prevail over federal common law. To do so would
stand the system of federal-state relations on its head.
Some have argued that the special status of admiralty courts
accounts for important misconceptions in the development of
judgment recognition law in the United States.247 Noting that
"until 1840 the vast majority of cases involving foreign judgments
admiralty decrees,"248 and that
in American courts involved ...

243
244
245

Id. at 653.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Alternative Theories, supra note 47, at 653-54.

246 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. Much of today's public international
law consists of agreements directly affecting the activities of private parties. See, eg.,
Brand, Private Parties and GATF Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on Section
337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24J. WORLD TRADE 5 (June 1990). Multilateral and bilateral treaties often set up specific rules and procedures that apply to both private and
sovereign parties in their relations with one another, in contrast to the traditional pu~blic
international law notion of rules applying only to sovereign parties. Se e.g., Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.LA.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted in 4 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 532 (1965); United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, reprinted in
1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 655 (S. Zamora & R. Brand eds.
1990).
247 See, eg., Peterson, supra note 47, at 224-29.
248 Id. at 226.
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"admiralty judgments derived preclusive effect by virtue of the status of admiralty courts as 'international courts' under international
law,"249 Professor Peterson finds that early admiralty cases (applying in rem jurisdiction, concepts) provide no solid precedent for
deciding the preclusive effect of foreign in personam judgments
rendered by traditional civil courts. 'The Law of Nations, which
had once served as such a basis for recognition of admiralty decrees, had no direct application to judgments of the domestic
courts of foreign nations."" ° This analysis seems inconsistent
with the historic development of the Law of Nations, a law applicable to mercantile transactions as well as sovereign relations. The
analysis also seems inconsistent with the traditional application (exemplified in both Swift and Hilton) of the Law of Nations to commercial relations.
Other cases have determined that, as a matter of state law,
rules of recognition and enforcement are subject to preemption
by federal law. In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices
Inc.," 1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held New York's version of the Recognition Act controlling in an action for enforcement of a Curacaoan judgment enforcing an arbitral award rendered in Curacao. 2 However, noting the "clear distinction between action on an [arbitral] award and action on a judgment
enforcing the award,"25 the court noted that in the former case,
New York state law is preempted by the United Nations Arbitration Convention' 4 and the Federal Arbitration Act. 5 If federjudgments, it
al law covered the issue of enforcement of foreign
256
would preempt state law in a similar manner.

249

Id. at 225.

250

I& at 230.

251
252

489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
Id. at 1319.

253

Id.

254 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 2.
255 9 U:S.C. § 201-307 (1988).
256 See also Soci& Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. United States D. C., 482 U.S.
522 (1987), where the four dissenters would have established a presumption in favor of

the use of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLCr OF LAWS, infra note 258, was cited in support of the need for adequate consideration of the policies of other countries and of the community of nations. AAtspatiale,
482 U.S. at 547-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Others have considered federal common law an appropriate
source of a uniform rule governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.257 The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws has predicted exceptions to the application of
state law to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
followed by preemption through this case-by-case application of
federal law.2"8 With recent determinations that federal law governs issues regarding forum selection clauses, 259 forum non conveniens, 2' and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, 26 ' it
is arguable that this process of carving out exceptions has already
begun.

26 2

2. Jus Gentium and Federal Common Law: The Lost Legacy of
Sift v. Tyson
The Rules of Decision Act265 has been roundly criticized by
commentators as creating circular reasoning:

257
258

See supra note 121.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment c (1986 Revision).

The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed upon the question
whether federal or state law governs the recognition of foreign nation judgments. The consensus among the state courts and lower federal courts that have
passed upon the question is that, apart from federal question cases, such recognition is governed by state law and that the federal courts will apply the law of
the state in which they sit. It can be anticipated, however, that in due course
some exceptions will be engrafted upon the general principle. So it seems probable that federal law would be applied to prevent application of a state rule on
the recognition of foreign nation judgments if such application would result in
the disruption or embarrassment of the foreign relations of the United States.
Id.
259 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
260 Sabaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), celt. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985).
261 Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denieA, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
262 One commentator has argued for a federal common law rule on the enforcement
of judgments for practical reasons:
U.S. judgments may be denied enforcement abroad because a foreign court
erroneously assumes that U.S. courts would not enforce its judgments. The presence of a single federal common law of enforcement would reduce the present
complexity and should lead to a better understanding of the relevant U.S. law
by foreign courts. This would make it simpler to show U.S. reciprocity and
therefore easier to obtain foreign enforcement of U.S. judgments.
R. von Mehren, supra note 47, at 408.
263 Supra note 215.
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[C]reation of federal common law would appear to constitute a
violation of the Rules of Decision Act ....
Perhaps a persuasive response to this argument is that the
Act's language contains within it a circularity which renders it
all but useless. To say that state laws shall serve as the rules of
decision "incases where they apply" ultimately fails to tell us to
which cases state laws specifically "apply." "
It has been argued that section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
"was generally understood to be merely declaratory of existing law;
that is, even if the section had never been enacted, the federal
courts would have followed the local law of the states in cases.
where it applied."26 Early judicial recognition of a distinction
between "general" and "local" law lends credence to the position
that state law simply was not meant to "apply" to certain categories
gentium, and thereof cases, especially those falling within the jus
266
fore governed by the general law of nations.
In Erie, Justice Brandeis' rejection of the Swift v. Tyson approach to section 34 was based in large part upon the "more
recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the original document, which established that the construction given to it
by the court was erroneous."267 Current analysis raises questions

264 M. RtDISH, supra note 205, at 81.
265 Fletcher, The General Common Law and &dion 34 of the Judiciaty Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insuran= 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1527 (1984).
266 Jay, Origins of the Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1264-65
(1985); see also BLAcK's LAW DIcIoNARY 772 (5th ed. 1979).
Although this phrase had a meaning in the Roman law which may be rendered by our expression "law of nations," it must not be understood as equivalent to what we now call "international law," its scope being much wider. It was
originally a system of law, or more properly equity, gathered by the early Roman
lawyers and magistrates from the common ingredients in the customs of the old
Italian tribes,-those being the nations, gentes, whom they had opportunities of
observing,-to be used in cases where the js civile did not apply, that is, in cases
between foreigners or between a Roman citizen and a foreigner. The principle
upon which they proceeded was that any rule of law which was common to all
the nations they knew of must be intrinsically consonant to right reason, and
therefore fundamentally valid and just. From this it was an easy transition to the
converse principle, viz., that any rule which instinctively commended itself to
their sense of justice and reason must be a part of the js gentium. And so the
latter term came eventually to be about synonymous with "equity," (as Romans
understood it), or the system of praetorian law.
Id.
267 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). This scholar was Charles Warren, in his artide Warren, New Light on the Histoy of the FederalJudciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
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about whether the Court should have been so quick to refute Swift
on this basis.2 s
In Swift, Justice Story interpreted section 34 as applying "to
state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the
state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals,
269
and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality."
He explicitly rejected its application to "questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation." 270 In contrast, Justice
Brandeis, in Erie, took the position that section 34 applies to all
matters of law, making no distinction between those matters covered by "local" and "general" law. Two approaches favoring federal
common law development in areas such as enforcement of foreign
judgments seem worthy of consideration here; one is based on the
contrast between Swift and Erie, and the other is based upon a
reappraisal of the "general" law (the jus gentium or lex mercatoia 71) applied in Swift.
(a) Redefining the Swift/Erie Distinction.-The post-Erie development of federal common law suggests an analytical structure
that would give the language of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 neither the limited reading of Swift nor the expansive reading often ascribed to Erie. Swift limited the language in section 34
to matters of "local" law, leaving the rest for the federal courts on
a theory of "general" law recognized throughout the common law.
Erie, on the other hand, read section 34 to mean that "the laws of
the states" included all law within the states, whether "declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision."2 72 Rather than a distinction between "local" law and "general" law, or a distinction between all law and none, post-Erie cases
indicate that a more appropriate focus may be simply between
state law and federal law.
Erie tells us that in most cases it is the law of the state that
will apply as the rule of decision in federal cases under diversity
jurisdiction. Later cases have acknowledged limited areas that
remain the province of federal law, whether constitutional, statuto-

268 Jay, supra note 266, at 1264-65.
269 Swift v. Tyson, 16 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 17 (1842).
270 1&dat 18.
271 See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952).
272 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 64, 78 (1938).

1991]

FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS

ry, or common law in origin. 273 The effort in each case should
be directed at determining the scope of this area covered by federal common law, and which rules apply in determining when a
specific matter falls within this category.
A second element of Erie was concern with the forum shopping potential of the legacy of Swift. The limited reading of section 84 in Swift was seen, in practice, as introducing "grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens," and making "rights
enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to
whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court."274 This is not a problem in the federal common law rules

carved out subsequent to Erie. These rules are applicable equally
in state and federal courts, thereby preventing any benefits of forum shopping within a' state.275 In fact, they work to prevent fo-

rum shopping by providing a single rule applicable whether the
action is brought in state or federal court.
(b) Redefining theJus Gentium of Swift.-Just as post-Erie cases
articulating the development of federal common law indicate a
distinction between Swift and Erie in the interpretation of section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, they also provide particular direction in consideration of federal common law in the area of international relations. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino provides authority for the development of federal common law applicable to
international relations concerns, distinguishing that area from others in which federal common law has been applied since Erie- 6
In Sabbatino, the Court was faced with decisions in the district and
circuit courts that had decided the case through the interpretation
and application of international law.277 Although the Supreme

Court based its decision upon abstention flowing from "constitutional underpinnings" in the relationship, between the executive
and judiciary branches,2 7 it did so only after indicating that if

273 Supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
274 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
275 See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text. But see Johnston v. Compagnie
Confrale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 385-88, 152 N.E. 121, 122-24 (1926) (holding
that the United States Supreme Court decision in Hilton involved private international law
and was therefore not binding on state courts).
276 Supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
277 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.) and 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
278 Supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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the applicable international law rule had been clearly developed, it
would itself have applied international law.279
Deference to international concerns and the role of the executive branch in dealing with such concerns were integral aspects
of the act of state doctrine applied in Sabbatino. It is here that a
relationship to Swift exists. Swift applied general commercial law
developed as part of the jus gentium, or law of nations. Justice
Story found "[tIhe law respecting negotiable instruments truly
declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in
Luke v. Lyde, to be in great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world."211 Justice Story considered the applicable law to be that of the law merchant, which he
considered a part of the law of nations, and thereby a part of the
law of the United States to be applied "generally" in our courts.
This application of the private transactional rules of the law
of nations is not unique to Swift. In Hilton v. Guyot,2 81 Justice
Gray made explicit the application of the same rules to the question of enforcement of foreign judgments in United States courts:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive
sense-including not only questions of right between nations,
governed by what has been appropriately called the law of
nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called
private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of
one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within
the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as
often as such questions are presented in litigation282between man
and man, duly submitted to their determination.
Like "public" international law, Justice Gray would find this "private" international law in treaties, if possible-and if not, then in
"judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators,
2
and from the acts and usages of civilized nations." 11
There is a common thread running from Swift to Hilton to
Erie to Sabbatino, but it is difficult to pin down. Although Erie rejected a general federal common law, both Swift and Hilton based
their holdings on concepts of jus gentium that arguably go beyond

279
280
281
282
283

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
Swift v. Tyson, 16 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 163.
Id.
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the jurisprudential underpinnings of federal common law in other
areas, and therefore go beyond the limitations of Erie itself in the
interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Professor
Henkin makes a distinction between federal common law as judgemade law and international law as judge-found law. 8 4 If private
international law is a part of our law as "international law" rather
than as "federal common law," then the rules of that law "must be
ascertained and administered by the courts," in accordance with
Justice Gray's statements. In that case, it makes sense to have the
federal courts "finding" that law.
To date, there has been no prohibition on state courts applying international law as the law of the United States. This raises
exactly the concern expressed in Erie with the "general common
law" interpretation of section 34 in Swift. However, in this case it
augurs for the opposite result for exactly the same reasons. So
long as we have issues of international law being determined in
both federal and state courts, we run the risk of application of different interpretations of the rules and a resulting promotion of
forum shopping.2 85 Conceptually, there can be only one rule of
international law applicable in United States courts, and it should
be the same no matter what court is involved.
If common law includes general law as determined in Swift,
then it overlaps with international law in cases implicating the
conduct of international relations. Professor Henkin's distinction
between judge-made law and judge-found law may become a distinction without meaning in the application of some rules of private international law. But we must realize that the law considered
here, no matter what the moniker, must be applied uniformly in
all courts in order to present a unified position in our relations
with other nations. The best way to approach such consistency in
judicial decisions is to develop that law under the rubric of what is
now considered federal common law.
This discourse is open to the criticism that a rule on the
enforcement of foreign judgments, like the act of state doctrine, is
neither required nor prohibited by international law.286 However,
Justice Gray did find the rule applicable in 1895 to be part of the

284 Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561
(1984).
285

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938).

286

Supra note 220 and accompanying text.

318
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jus gentium and therefore governed by the law of nations.8 7 The
important concern is that our approach to the enforcement of foreign judgments has significant implications for our relations with
the sovereign states from which those judgments issue. It must be
dealt with in a uniform federal system. Experience has demonstrated that any other approach is inconsistent with the forum shopping concerns of EDie, contrary to the judicial respect for international law demonstrated in Hilton, and likely to frustrate the concern for uniform national representation in matters of international relations reflected in Sabbatino.
3.

Effect of Federal Common Law

A federal common law rule on recognition and enforcement
would be applicable in both federal and state courts through the
preemptive weight granted to a substantive federal common law
rule. 2' Thus, uniformity among the states and between state and
federal systems would be achieved. Ultimately, the source of the
rule would be the United States Supreme Court, with its pronouncements providing singular authority to be followed by all
United States courts.
By providing a singular rule for United States recognition and
enforcement practice, a federal common law rule would also simplify the process of proving United States law in a foreign court.
The confusion engendered by multiple sources of rules and by a
federal system that requires reference to state law could be avoided. If the rule adopted as common law were consistent with that
set forth in the Recognition Act and the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law, it would then be easier to prove that a
United States court would enforce a judgment of the foreign jurisdiction, thus facilitating satisfaction of foreign court reciprocity
requirements. While not providing the assurances of foreign court
recognition and enforcement available in a bilateral or multilateral
treaty, a federal common law rule would go a long way toward
improving United States practice and promoting the recognition
and enforcement of United States judgments overseas.

287
288

Supra note 282 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

1. Issues Affecting a Federal Rule
Federal courts with diversity jurisdiction have consistently held
the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign country money judgments to be governed by state law.2" 9 As indicated above,
this does not prevent federal law preemption on the recognition
and enforcement rule through treaty,'
federal legislation,"'
or federal common law. 2 A fourth method of federalization of
the rule on recognition and enforcement is possible: the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Even though federal procedure points to state law for purposes of enforcement procedure," in accord with Erie, an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would change the
matter in federal courts. The Supreme Court in Hanna v.
2 4 made clear that:
Plumer
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the
terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions. 5
Thus, if a Federal Rule existed governing recognition and enforcement, that Rule would be applicable in both federal question
and diversity cases before federal courts. If the case were originally
brought in state court, the Federal Rule could be made
applicable
6
available.2
where
court
federal
to
removal
through

289
290
291
292

Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 134-84 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 192-288 and accompanying text.
293 Supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
294 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
295 Id at 471.

296 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988):
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
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Under the Rules Enabling Act, 9 7 Congress has authorized
the Supreme Court "to prescribe, by general rules, for the district
courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of
Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure in civil actions.""8 Amendments to
the Rules are proposed by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules and are reported to Congress by the Chief Justice. 29 They automatically become effective ninety days after being reported to Congress, unless Congress legislates otherwise.'
As already noted, Rule 69 provides that "the procedure on
execution [to enforce a judgment for the payment of money] ...
shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the
state in which the district court is held," except to the extent
federal law prescribes, or the court directs, otherwise."' Rule
9(e) governs the pleading of judgments, specifically applying to
decisions of "domestic or foreign court[s] ."502 Other Federal
Rules deal more specifically with issues of transnational litigation.
Rule 44(a)(2) provides the procedure for proof of foreign official
records,"3 and Rule 44.1 provides that determinations of foreign

297 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988)).
298 Id.
299 For a discussion of the history of the Federal Rules and the procedure for their
creation and amendment, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAGTIcE AND PROCEDURE ch. 1 (1987). The requirement that proposed rules be reported to Congress is
found in the Rules Enabling Act:
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by
the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not
later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they
have been thus reported.
28 U.S.C. § 2072, para. 2 (1988).
300 Rules Enabling Act, supra note 297.
301 FED. R. CIv. P. 69; see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
302 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(e).
303 FED. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(2):
A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof, or a copy thereof, attested
by a person authorized to make the attestation, and accompanied by a final certification of the genuineness of signature and official position (i) of the attesting
person, or (ii) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the attestation or is in a chain of certificates
of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the attestation. A
final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy legation, consul general, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States.
If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authen-
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law are to be made by the court upon consideration of "any relevant material or source."m4 Both of these provisions were added
by amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.
The language of Rule 44.1 in part parallels article VI of the earlier Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, approved
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962.05 Thus,
not only is a Federal Rule a possible target for changing the rule
for recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments in
federal courts, but there exists precedent for enacting the substance of uniform act procedures in the form of a Federal Rule.

ticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown,

(i) admit an attested copy without final certification or (ii) permit the foreign
official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final
certification.
Requirements for legalization of documents are further dealt with in the Convention
Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (Hague
Legalisation Convention), _
U.S.T. ._,
T.I.A.S. No. 10072, 527 U.N.T.S. 189, reprinted
in 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 44 (West Supp. 1990) and 20 I.LM. 1409 (1981). The Hague Convention entered into force for the United States on October 15, 1981. With thirty-five
other countries currently party, it is the most widely-accepted convention in the area of
international civil procedure. See Low, Introduction to Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, in 11 BASIC DOcUMENTS OF INT'L ECONOMIC LAW
845 (S. Zamora & R. Brand eds. 1990).
304 FED. R. Crv. P. 44.1:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign
country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The
court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.
Id.

305 13 U.LA. 355, 394-97 (1986). Sections 4.01-.03 are the provisions of the Uniform
Act traced by Rule 44.1. They read as follows:
§ 4.01 [Notice]
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this state shall give notice in his
pleadings or other reasonable written notice.
§ 4.02 [Materials to Be Considered]
In determining the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof
outside this state, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the
rules of evidence.
§ 4.03 [Court Decision and Review]
The court, not jury, shall determine the law of any governmental unit
outside this state. Its determination is subject to review on appeal as a ruling on
a question of law.
The Uniform Act has been adopted in only four states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands. I4 at 53 (Supp. 1991).
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Effect of Adoption of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

The principal advantage of a Federal Rule would be in the
unification of practice before the federal courts. No longer would
a federal district court be subject to the contortions required by
Erie when the rule has not been clearly stated by either the state
legislature or judiciary. Further, with the tendency of state systems
to copy or at least emulate the Federal Rules,"° the existence of
a Federal Rule would likely promote uniformity among the states.
Even if a state did not follow the Federal Rule, where diversity
jurisdiction exists, the parties would have the option of going to
federal court, either through the initiation of the action there or
by removal. Thus, while not immediately providing a singular rule
for federal and state courts, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
would markedly improve the existing system.
A Federal Rule would also create greater possibility that a
United States judgment would be enforced in a foreign court. A
Rule consistent with the Recognition Act and the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law would make it easier to prove
that a United States federal court would enforce a judgment of
the foreign jurisdiction, thus facilitating satisfaction of foreign
court reciprocity requirements. With the rule in written code-type
format, a Federal Rule would easily be demonstrated to a foreign
court when recognition or enforcement of a United States judgment is sought. While not providing the certainty of foreign court
practice resulting from a bilateral or multilateral treaty, a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure would be a substantial improvement in
promoting the recognition and enforcement of United States judgments overseas.
VII. CONCLUSION: AN ASSESSMENT OF UNIFORMITY
AND FOREIGN RECOGNITION AS NECESSARY AND REALISTIC GOALS,
AND SOME COMMENTS ON HOW BEST TO PURSUE THEM

The question which perhaps first should have been addressed
in this discussion is whether there is any practical need for change
in United States law on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The above discussion demonstrates the academic prob-

306 See, e.g., Oakley & Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986); 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.1-9.53, at 46-80 (Wright ed. 1960).
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lems with the existing system, but fails to provide substantive evidence of a practical problem. While foreign reciprocity requirements and a morass of sources for United States rules appear to
present problems in the enforcement of United States judgments
abroad, there is little empirical demonstration that the apparent
problem is a real one. It may be that this omission is a result of
the problems of searching multiple foreign legal systems, whose
materials are in differing languages and formats. At the same time,
it may be that academic concern with a challenging intellectual
issue simply is not mirrored by the real world practice of law.
Perhaps the practicing bar has had no real problem with recognition and enforcement of United States judgments abroad-just as,
despite the differing sources of the rules, foreign parties have had
little practical problem with enforcement of foreign judgments in
the United States.
Yet, in a world in which business transactions and people are
constantly crossing sovereign borders, it seems likely that the indications that some practical problems exist justify preventing the
magnification of these problems in the future. Moreover, transnational consideration of legal process in the past has contributed to
a better understanding of differing legal systems and a valuable
reexamination of home country practices.307 This exercise should
continue.
A survey conducted in the early 197 0s by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, at the request of the Chairman
of the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, concluded that "[t]he principal reason for failure to
secure enforcement abroad was lack of reciprocity. " "' A similar
study by the Committee on International Law of the New York
State Bar Association reported that, while foreign country judgments "have generally been recognized and enforced in the United States," "nonrecognition of United States' judgments abroad is
the rule rather than the exception." ° This report attributed

307 The history of the various conventions of UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law and UNIDROIT provides numerous examples of valuable comparative study, whether or not each consideration of a new convention resulted in a
widely-accepted agreement on a new set of rules.
308 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A Summary of the Replies
to a Questionnaire Prepared by the Association of the Bar (1972), quoted in R. von
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 47, at 80.
309 Report and Proposed Resolution of Committee on International Law (1972), quoted in R. von Mehren & Patterson, .-upra note 47, at 81.
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nonrecognition to both the absence of recognition treaties and to
foreign country reciprocity requirements.1 0
Each of the available alternatives for seeking improvement of
United States law on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments has its disadvantages. The following chart categorizes
each alternative in terms of the goals of (1) state/state uniformity;
(2) state/federal uniformity; (3) international acceptance (i.e., the
ability either to prove the rule for reciprocity purposes in the
foreign court or to obtain recognition and enforcement through
treaty obligation); and (4) exorbitant jurisdiction protection (i.e.,
the ability to avoid enforcement in foreign courts of other foreign
countries' judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction provisions).

310

Id.:

Starting with the Common Market countries, United States judgments are not
enforceable in the Netherlands because its law requires the existence of a treaty;
they are reexamined on the merits in Belgium; they are subject to a statutory
reciprocity requirement in Germany that is often difficult to establish to the
satisfaction of the German courts, which are accustomed to look to statutes rather than to court decisions; and they are by statute subject to reexamination on
the merits in Italy if rendered by default. In the Scandinavian countries, a treaty
is needed for enforcement. In the rest of Western Europe, as well as in Latin
America, the situation does not differ substantially. Under the Code of Quebec,
any defense which might have been made in the original action may be pleaded
against a judgment rendered outside Canada. Conclusive effect is also denied
United States judgments in some other Canadian provinces as well.
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COMPARISONS OF THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES
FOR CHANGING UNITED STATES LAW ON RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN MONEYJUDGMENTS
state/state
uniformity

state/fed.
uniformity

int'l
acceptance

exorbitant
jurisdct'n
protection

adoption
of
UFMJRA
& UEFJA

YES
if adopted
without
modifications

YES*

reciprocity
easier to
prove, but
not guaranteed

NO

multilateral
treaty

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

bilateral
treaties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

YES
with
respect to
treaty
parties

federal
statute

YES

YES

reciprocity
easier to
prove, but
not guaranteed

NO

federal
common
law

YES

YES

reciprocity
easier to
prove, but
not guaranteed

NO

Federal
Rule of
Civil Procedure

NO
unless all
states
adopt
federal
rule

NO
unless all
states
adopt
federal
rule

reciprocity
easier to
prove for
federal
judgments

NO
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*Eriewould create uniformity between state law and the law applicable in diversity cases in federal courts. Uniformity is uncertain in
federal question cases in light of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895), and the potential for continuing validity of its reciprocity
requirement.
[The above comment applies to the chart on the previous page]

Consistent comprehensive adoption of the Recognition Act
and the Enforcement Act would provide uniformity among the
states, and, through the Erie doctrine, would result in uniformity
between state court and federal court diversity practice. While the
resultant codification would make it easier to prove reciprocity
before a foreign court, adoption would not guarantee foreign
court recognition or enforcement, and would fail to address the
problems of exorbitant jurisdiction practice under the Brussels and
Lugano conventions.
Adoption of a singular federal rule through a treaty, federal
legislation, federal common law, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would unify federal law and prevent a different rule from
being applied from one federal district court to the next. Through
preemption of state law, the first three of these four options
would provide state/federal uniformity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. If states would follow an
amendment to the Federal Rules with amendments to their own
procedure, it may be that an amendment to the Federal Rules
would also led to both state/state and state/federal uniformity.
Like comprehensive adoption of the uniform acts, however, federal legislation, federal common law, and a Federal Rules amendment could not directly address the concern with foreign court
recognition and enforcement of United States judgments. Although they may, by providing a singular rule, make proof of reciprocity less complicated, they would provide no guarantees and
could not address concerns regarding judgments based only on
exorbitant jurisdictional grounds.
Of the available alternatives, only a multilateral treaty with
broad-based participation throughout the world will address all of
the problems of state/state uniformity, state/federal uniformity,
foreign court recognition, and exorbitant jurisdiction protection.
Given the convergence of litigation and arbitration practice since
the promulgation of the United Nations Convention on the Rec-
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ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,311 the
time may have come to consider a multilateral treaty on recognition and enforcement of judgments under the auspices of
UNCITRAL or the Hague Conference on Private International
Law.
The argument against a multilateral treaty is that there is no
practical hope of achieving such a grand goal. Too many countries
remain opposed to United States discovery practice, excessive United States jury verdicts, treble damage awards under United States
antitrust, securities and RICO laws, and the extraterritorial application of United States laws generally. The existence of other multilateral treaties addressing transnational judicial procedure give
reason for hope of progress through a judgments convention.
While the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters has not engendered foreign acceptance of United States discovery practice, 12 the Convention
has led to increased discussion of the similarities and differences
in legal systems, and the hope of fewer problems in the future.3 13
Perhaps the best argument for a multilateral treaty lies in the
implications of unification of United States law on recognition and
enforcement of judgments through any of the. other methods.
Treaties represent the compromise of sovereign positions on matters of importance to each of the parties involved. While unification of recognition and enforcement procedure in the United
States has value to the United States system itself, it would also
serve to eliminate problems remaining in a United States system
that already makes the enforcement of a foreign country judgment
the rule rather than the exception. Unification through federal
legislation, federal common law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or comprehensive and consistent adoption of uniform acts
ironically would provide the foreign parties most, if not all, of the

311 Supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
312 23 U.S.T. 2555; T.I.A.S. No. 7444; 847 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 37 (1969) and 28 U.S.CA. § 1781 (West 1982).
313 The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361; T.IA.S. No. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S.
163, repinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 341 (1965), and Hague Convention Abolishing
the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, _
U.S.T. _,
T.I.A.S.
No. 10072; 527 U.N.T.S. 189, epinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1409 (1981), are
other examples of multilateral conventions on judicial procedure that facilitate
transnational judicial practice.

328

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:253

benefits their sovereigns would seek for them in a treaty on recognition and enforcement. Thus, state-state and state-federal unification through a means other than a multilateral treaty runs the risk
of inhibiting the joint goals of foreign country recognition of
United States judgments, and protection against enforcement of
judgments based on exorbitant jurisdictional grounds.
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APPENDIX
STATE-BY-STATE ENACTMENT OF THE
UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT
AND THE

UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
(CURRENT TO JUNE OF 1991)

An asterisk (*) denotes those states which have added a reciprocity requirement in their adoption of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition.
State

Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments
Act

Uniform Money
Judgments Recognition
Act

ALABAMA

ALA. CODE §§ 6-9-280
to 6-9-238 (Supp. 1990)

none

ALASKA

ALASKA

STAT.

§§

09.30.200 to 09.30.270
(1983)
ARIZONA

ARI.

REV.

STAT. ANN.

§§
STAT.
ALASKA
09.30.100 to 09..30.180
(1983)
none

§§ 12-1701 to 12-1708
ARKANSAS

ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
16-66-601 to 16-66-619
(Supp. 1989)

none

CALIFORNIA

None. (adopted act for
sister state judgments.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1710 to 1710.65
(West 1982).

CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
to
1713.8
§§ 1713
(West 1982)

COLORADO

COLO. REv. STAT. §8
13-53-101 to 13-53-108
(1987)

COLO. REv. STAT. §8

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52-604 to 52-609
(West Supp. 1990)

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4781 to 4787 (Supp.
1990)

none

CONNECTICUT

DELAWARE

13-62-101 to
13-62-109 (1987)

§§ 52-610 to 52-618
(West Supp. 1990)
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DISTRICT
COLUMBIA

D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15351 to 15-357 (1990)t

nonet

FLORIDA

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
55.501 to 55.509 (West
Supp. 1991)

none

GEORGIA

GA. CODE ANN. §§
to 9-12-138
9-12-130
(Supp. 1990)

*GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9to
1-12-117
12-110
(1982)

HAWAII

HAW. REV. STAT. §§
to
638C-8
636C-1
(1985)

none

IDAHO

IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1301

*IDAHO CODE §§ 101401 to 10-1409 (1990)

to 10-1308 (1990)
(1990)
ILLINOIS

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 110,

paras. 12-601 to 12-617
1984)
(Smith-Hurd
(1948 version)

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
paras. 12-618 to 12-626
(Smith-Hurd 1984)

INDIANA

none

none

IOWA

IOWA CODE ANN. §§
626A.1 to 626A.8 (West
Supp. 1990)

IOWA

KANSAS

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
60-3008
to
60-3001
(1983)

none

KENTUCKY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 426.950 to 426.975
(Baldwin Supp. 1990)

none

LOUISIANA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:4241 to 13:4247
(West 1991)

none (But see LA. CODE
CIV. PRoc. art. 2541
(West 1961) and La.
Rev. Stat. § 13:4243)

MAINE

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, §§ 8001 to 8008
(1980)

none

MARYLAND

MD. CrS. &JuD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-801 to
11-807 (Supp. 1989)

MD. CrS. & JUD. PRoc.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to
10-709 (1989)

CODE ANN. §§
626B.1 to 626B.8 (West
Supp. 1990)
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*MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

none

ch. 235, § 23A (West
1986)
MICHIGAN

none

MINNESOTA

MINN.

LAws
Mimc.
CoMp.
ANN. §§ 691.1151 to
691.1159 (West 1987)
STAT.

ANN.

§§

548.26 to 548.33 (West
1988)

MINN. STAT. ANN.
548.35 (West 1988)

§

MISSISSIPPI

MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 1111-7-309
to
7-301
(Supp. 1990)

none

MISSOURI

STAT. §
Mo. ANN.
511.760 (Vernon 1952)
(1948 version)

Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
511.770
to
511.787
(Vernon Supp. 1991)

MONTANA

MONT. CODE ANN. §§
25-9-510
to 15-9-508
(1989)

noneif

NEBRASKA

NEB. REV. STAT.

§§ 2525-15,104
1587
to
(1985) (1948 version)

none

NEVADA

NEV.

REV.

STAT.

§§ 17.330 to
(Michie 1986)

ANN.

none

17.400

NEW HAMPSHIRE

none

none- f

NEWJERSEY

none-ftt

none

NEW MEXICO

1989 N.M. Laws 256,
signed Apr. 6, 1989

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3941-1 to 39-4B-9.
1991 N.M. Laws 180,
(effective July 1, 1991)

NEW YORK

N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
5408
5401
to
§§
(McKinney 1978)'

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R.
5309
5301
to
§§
(McKinney 1978)

NORTH CAROLINA

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IC1701 to 1C-1708 (Supp.
1990)

none

NORTH DAKOTA

N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2820.1-01 to 28-20.1-08

none
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2329.021 to 2329.027
(Anderson 1991)

*OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 719 to 726 (West
1988)

OKLA.

OR. REV. STAT. §§
24.105 to 24.175 (1988)

OR.

42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4306 (Purdon
1981)

42 PA. CONS. STAT. §

RHODE ISLAND

RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-321 to 9-32-8 (1985)

none

SOUTH CAROLINA

none

none

SOUTH DAKOTA

S.D.
CODIFED LAWS
ANN. §§ 15-16A-I to 1516A-10 (1984)

none

TENNESSEE

TENN. CODE ANN. §§
to 26-6-107
26-6-101
(1980)

none

TEXAS

Thx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 35.001 to
35.008 (Vernon 1986)

*TEx.

UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-22a-1 TO 78-22a-8
(1987)

none

VERMONT

none

none

VIRGINIA

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01to
8.01-465.5
465.1
(Supp. 1990)

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01465.6 to 8.01-465.13
(Supp. 1990)

WASHINGTON

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.36.010 to 6.36.910
(1963)

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 6.40.010 to 6.40.915
(Supp. 1991)

WEST VIRGINIA

W. VA. CODE §§ 55-14-1
to 55-14-8 (Supp. 1990)

none

OHIO

OKLAHOMA

OREGON

PENNSYLVANIA

§§ 2329.90 to 2329.94
(Anderson 1991)
STAT. ANN.

ti.

12, §§ 710 to 718 (West
1988)
REV.

STAT.

§§

24.200 to 24.255 (1988)

22001-22009

CIrv.

PRAC.

&

REM. CD. AN. §§ 36.001
to 86.008 (Vernon 1986
& Supp. 1991)
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WISCONSIN

WIs. STAT. ANN.
806.24 (West 1977)

§

none

WYOMING

WYO. STAT. §§ 1-17-701
to 1-17-707 (1988)

none

43
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NUMBER OF STATES
ENACTING EACH
STATUTE: fl-t
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Se D.C. Code Ann. § 12-307 (1966): "An action upon a judgment or decree rent
dered in a State, territory, commonwealth or possession of the United States or in a foreign
country is barred if by the laws of that jurisdiction, the action would there be barred and
the judgment or decree would be incapable of being otherwise enforce [sic] there."
Montana has not enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
f
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-3-205 (1990) makes in rem foreign judgments conclusive as to the
title to the thing and in personam foreign judgments "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties," subject to attack only on grounds of 'want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (1974), requires reciprocity to be shown for the
ttt
enforcement of a Canadian federal or provincial judgment.
New Jersey has enacted neither of the uniform acts. However, see N.J. STAT. ANN.
tt
§§ 2A:82-4.1 to 2A:82-4.7 (West Supp. 1990), specifically creating burdens on the enforcement of judgments under the Philadelphia Wage and New Profits Tax Ordinance.
Sources for determining which states have adopted a uniform act tend to differ.
tttt
Whereas most of the above statutes are noted in UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, published by
West Publishing Company, as of June 10, 1991, the Chicago office of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) listed 41 jurisdictions (including
Puerto Rico, but excluding Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina) that had adopted
UEFJA, and did not include Iowa or Ohio in its list of 20 jurisdictions that had adopted
UFMJRA.

